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ARTICLES
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF RELIGIOUS
UPBRINGING AGREEMENTS
MARTIN WEISS*

& ROBERT ABRAMOFF**

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses religion in custody disputes. Specifically
it analyzes whether an antenuptial agreement on the religious upbringing of children, entered into by the child's parents, is enforceable over the objection of one of the parents.
In light of the high rate of interfaith marriages, and the high
rate of divorce, the enforceability of agreements on religious upbringing demands the courts' attention. There are over 750,000 children in this country of Jewish-Christian intermarriages alone.'
This figure does not include children of "broken faith marriages,"
marriages in which one parent changes religion after the marriage
commences or terminates. This change may occur when a partner,
who converted to the spouse's religion, later disassociates with that
religion. Alternatively, this change in religion may arise when one
partner converts to another religion as a result of proselytization or
self-searching. This paper focuses on the sequelae of such broken
faith marriages, where one partner acted in reliance on the other's
commitment, as opposed to a mere interfaith marriage, where there
was no such firm commitment. Religious conflict in divorce is not
limited to Jewish-Christian marriages. Such disputes take place in
Protestant-Catholic marriages, and other interfaith marriages as
well. The number of children affected in such situations is no doubt
great.
Conventional wisdom holds that antenuptial agreements on the
religious upbringing of children are not enforceable. 2 Parties op* Martin Weiss received a B.S. from Wayne State University in Psychology and an M.D. from Wayne State University Medical School.
** Robert Abranoff received a B.A. from Boston University in English
and a J.D. from the University of Southern California.
1. Dirk Johnson, Struggle for Custody of Childrens Faith Becomes

Nightmare,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1988, at Al, A46.
2. For reviews on the enforceability of antenuptial religious upbringing
agreements see Note, Enforceability of Antenuptial Contracts in Mixed Mar-

riages,50 YALE L. J. 1286 (1941); Comment, Parent'sRight to PrescribeReli.
gious Education of Children,3 DEPAuL L. REV. 83 (1953); Leo Pfeffer, Religion
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pose enforcement of such agreements, arguing objections based on
interpretations of contract law and First Amendment rights.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that these objections are of scant
substance. And, contrary to conventional wisdom, a review of the
case law demonstrates that the question is far from settled.
Courts that refuse to enforce religious upbringing agreements
often consign a child to being raised in two religions simultaneously. This article argues that such a result is neither in the best
interests of the child, nor demanded by law. This article begins
with a brief review of contract law and the First Amendment, as
applied to this issue. It then provides an overview of th- case law as
well as examines the best interests of the children in th.. context of
parental religious conflict. Next, this article comments on other reviews of this issue and the courts' relationship to religion. Finally,
this article concludes that courts should enforce religious upbringing agreements when the best interests of the child are served.
I. CONTRACT LAW

This article does not question that marriage itself is a contract.
Black's Law Dictionary succinctly defines marriage as, "[a] contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and
a woman capable of entering into such contract, mutually engage
with each other to live their whole lives [or until divorced] together
in a state of union which ought to exist between a husband and
wife." 3 Rather, the question here is whether an antenuptial agreement on the religious upbringing of children, when central and essential to a marriage contract, is subject to the principles of contract
law.
The philosophical basis for contract law derives from three
principles. 4 The first principle lies in the sanctity of the promise.
Both Canon lawyers and Talmudic scholars believed reneging on a
in the Upbringingof Children, 35 B.U. L. REV.333 (1955); Jack F. Smith, Contractsfor Religious Education of Children, 7 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 534 (1958).
For a broader discussion of religion in custody and visitation disputes see
Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: FactoringReligion into the Best Interest Equation,82 MICH.L. REy. 1702 (1984); A.
Collin Mangrum, Note, Religion in Child Custody, 15 CREIGHToN I. REV.25
(1981); Timothy M. O'Connor, Note, Religion:A Factorin Awarding Custody of
Infants?,31 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1958); Steven M. Zarowny, Note, The Religious
Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56 THE NoTRE DAME LAW. 160 (1980).
An exhaustive review of religion in child custody and visitation is found in Leo
R. Russ, Annotation, Religion As a Factor In Child Custody and Visitation
Cases, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 971 (1983).
3. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979).
4. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs 7
(3d ed. 1987).
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commitment made in free will was an offense against God.5 The
second principle revolves around the theory of private autonomy.
This element holds: "[r]ecognizing the desirability of allowing individuals to regulate, to a large extent, their own affairs, the State has
conferred upon them the power to bind themselves by expression of
their intention to be bound, provided, always, that they operate
within the limits of their delegated powers."'6 Finally, the third
principle is based on the reliance theory of contracts. This principle
holds that the "foundation of contract law is not in the will of the
promisor to be bound but in the expectations engendered by, and
the promisee's consequent reliance upon, the promise." 7 When antenuptial religious upbringing agreements are made in free will, involve voluntary binding and result in reliance by the other party,
basic principles of contract law clearly apply. Moreover, religious
upbringing agreements meet the criteria required for valid contracts. Those criteria are the presence of consideration, lack of duress and capability of the parties.
Three elements must exist for a promise to be supported by
consideration: (1) the promisee must suffer legal detriment, that is,
do or promise to do what he or she is not legally obligated to do, or
refrain from doing what he or she is legally privileged to do; (2) the
detriment must induce the promise; and (3) the promise must induce the detriment. When a person offers to agree to marriage, in
exchange for his future spouse's promise to raise their children in a
specific faith, the criteria for consideration have been met. A significant legal detriment is placed on the promisee (the marital status),
and one promise has induced another.
Second, neither party may be under duress at the time they
enter into the contract. However, unless the prospective wife is already pregnant, or the religious upbrining agreement is unexpectedly demanded immediately before the wedding ceremony, duress
is not present.
Finally, the parties must be capable of entering into the contract. Partners who are capable of entering into marriage are presumed to be capable of entering into an antenuptial agreement.
Thus, antenuptial religious upbringing agreements meet both the
principles and criteria for valid contracts. Nonetheless, some courts
hold these agreements invalid. Objections to antenuptial religious
upbringing agreements center on either a presumed lack of mutual
assent (indefiniteness), or on a presumed conflict with the First
Amendment.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 7.

7. Id. at 9.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:655

Courts may find a contract void for indefiniteness. Calamari
explains indefiniteness as follows:
The traditional rule is that if the agreement is not reasonably certain
(citation omitted) as to its materialterms there is a fatal indefiniteness
with the result that the agreement is void. (citation omitted). The rule
does not apply a precise standard. Vagueness and indefiniteness are
matters of degree. (citation omitted).
If the agreement is reasonably certain, it is enforced even though all of
the terms are not set forth with "optimal specificity." (citation omitted). It is enough that the agreement is sufficiently explicit so that the
court can perceive what are the respective obligations of the parties.
(citation omitted). In other words, the requirements of definiteness
cannot be pushed to extreme limits.8 (emphasis added)
In several instances, however, courts that cite indefiniteness as
a basis for voiding antenuptial religious upbringing agreements
push the requirement for definiteness to those extreme limits. For
example, in Lynch v. Unlenhopp9 a rather straightforward dispute
developed as to whether a child was to be raised as a Roman Catholic, as had been previously agreed, or as a Protestant. The court
opined:.
It is provided [by the agreement] that the said child shall be reared
in the Roman Catholic Religion. Is this language so clear, specific and
unequivocal that it can be readily understood? .... What constitutes
"rearing" a child in the religion? .... Must he be taken to church once
a week, or once in two weeks, or Sunday? If mid-week services are
held, must he be taken to them? Is it required that he attend catechism class? Must he attend a parochial school if the particular denomination in question maintains such schools? What fast days must
be observed, what Lenten observances followed? 10
The Lynch court erred because the issue was which of two
faiths the child was to be raised in, not the degree. Moreover, how
would the concept of indefiniteness apply in an antenuptial agreement to raise children in the Jewish faith, and specifically not the
Christian faith? Even if the court held the affirmative portion of
the agreement indefinite, the prohibitive portion of the contract is
still clear cut, the parents agreed not to raise their children in the
worship of Christ.
The extreme limits to which the court in Lynch pushed the
concept of indefiniteness becomes apparent if one subjects the marriage contract to the same test. For instance, what will constitute
sex in the marriage? Will intercourse be once a week, or once in
two weeks, or three times a week? Who will do the housework?
Will the housework be shared, and if so, in what proportions? Will
both parties work outside the home to generate income, or just one?
8. Id. at 54.
9. Lynch v. Unlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
10. Id. at 496-97.
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By the Lynch court's reasoning, the contract of marriage fails to be
valid for "indefiniteness." Clearly, this reasoning is faulty. What
defines the marriage contract is its exclusivity, its monogamous nature. What defined the religious upbringing agreement was also its
exclusivity, the child was to be raised in the Roman Catholic faith,
and no other.
Definiteness is a prerequisite for the validity of contracts under
only one theory of contract law." Most courts follow the objective
theory of contract law, which holds that the presence of assent is:
[D]etermined solely from objective manifestations of intent - namely
what a party says and does rather than what he subjectively intends or
believes or assumes. (citation omitted). Thus under the objective theory the mental assent and intent of the parties is irrelevant ....(citation omitted).
For at least a century the objective theory of contracts has been
dominant.
[The objective theory of contract law holds that the] objective manifestations of intent of the party should be viewed from the vantage point
of a reasonable man in the position of the other party .... (citation
omitted). In other words, a party's intention will be held to what a
reasonable man in the position
of the other party would conclude his
12
manifestations to mean.
The objective theory clearly encompasses marriage expectations.
For example, a detached, objective observer to a Jewish marriage
ceremony would be reasonable in assuming that the partners' plan
was to raise their children in the Jewish, and not the Islamic faith.
As these examples demonstrate, attacks on antenuptial religious
upbringing agreements based on contract law collapse.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment to the Constitution reads, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 3 The Amendment, as written, limits only Congress. Through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment applies to the
states.1 4 In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First
Amendment applicable to state judicial action as well as legislative
action. i 5 The First Amendment does not, however, apply to dealings between individuals. In applying the First Amendment to
avoid consideration of religious upbringing disputes in custody decisions, courts quote the Establishment Clause of the First Amend11. CALAMARI & PERLLo, supra note 4, at 26.
12. Id
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
15. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
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ment, as well as the Free Exercise Clause.16 While initially these
arguments appear potent, closer scrutiny reveals that they are, surprisingly, without basis.
A

The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause reads "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." 17 The founding fathers'
original intent for the Establishment Clause was merely to preclude
the federal government from establishing a church that favored one
Christian denomination over others. Although a number of the
states supported state-established churches until well after the
Revolution, the Establishment Clause prevented the federal government from aiding one denomination over another.' The Establishment Clause does not bar the courts from considering
antenuptial religious upbringing agreements because the court is
not establishing the religious identity of the children. The parents,
as a couple, establish their children's religious identity in the antenuptial agreement. The court's role in this aspect of the divorce
proceeding is only to ascertain the validity of that contract. Thus,
the court neither establishes nor sanctions any religion.
The following analogy illustrates the nature of the court's role
in considering antenuptial religious upbringing agreements. A
small church takes out an insurance policy to protect itself from
fire and theft losses. Unfortunately, a fire occurs, destroying the
church building. However, on rather dubious grounds, the insurance company refuses to honor the policy it issued; it refuses to
honor the contract. Would the courts, without considering the merits of the case, declare the insurance policy void and unenforceable
on the ground that supporting the congregants would result in the
court advancing the establishment of religion? Clearly, the court
would not take such a position. The court would view the issue as a
question of law, not theology. The same principle holds for antenuptial religious upbringing agreements. On neither a historical,
nor a legal basis, can consideration of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements conflict with the Establishment Clause.
B.

Neutrality: The Tripartite Test

Courts that deny the validity and enforceability of antenuptial
religious upbringing contracts have yet to critically an :yze the constitutional basis for their position. They simply assume that judicial
resolution of these disputes violates both the Establishment Clause
16. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. JoHN E. NowAx ET AL., CONSTrrUIONAL LAw 1032 (3d ed. 1986).
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and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and, therefore, they claim the court must take a position of "neutrality." As a
measure of such "neutrality," some courts employ the tripartite test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.19 The
lower courts' dependence on this test, however, is misplaced.2 ° The
Supreme Court created the Lemon criteria to evaluate whether
statutes enacted by government favor religion over non-religion.
These criteria, established to evaluate legislative programs, are not
appropriate in custody disputes.
Even though the tripartite test is of dubious value in assessing
antenuptial religious upbringing agreements, these agreements can
meet this test. The test requires, first, that the statute have a secular legislative purpose. 21 The family is the foundation of this nation, and religion is the bedrock of many families. With divorce, the
family is broken, but it is not destroyed. A single mother or a single
father raising children still constitutes a family. When the courts
allow further shredding of that family by permitting the children to
be indoctrinated into a second, alien religion, they create an additional trauma that may further upset an already traumatized
family.
Second, the test requires that the principal effect of the statute
neither advance nor inhibit religion. 22 The enforcement of antenuptial agreements on religious upbringing meet this element as
long as the courts do not prefer any specific religion, but rather,
enforce the antenuptial agreements on a case by case basis, utilizing
contract principles and not religious dogma. For instance, if the antenuptial agreement ordered the parents to raise the children as
atheists, and one of the divorcing parents became a born-again
Christian, the agreement would continue to be enforceable. Consequently, with this approach, the court would not accord preference
for one religion over another, or for religion over non-religion. Nor
would any individual case advance religion to even a minimal degree. If, in a single case, a court orders that a child be raised in the
Jewish faith, then the number of Jews in this country is increased
by 1/6,000,000. This advance is not statistically significant. Moreover, the advance will no doubt be counter-balanced by other decisions in which the court orders that a child is to be raised in the
Christian faith.
The third prong of the test requires that the state not foster an
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979) ("In order to uphold
constitutionality of the religious needs provision... we must further examine
the statute in accord with those tests [Lemon].").

21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
22. Id.
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excessive government entanglement with religion. 23 Antenuptial
agreements concern the religious identity, not the religious intensity, of a child's upbringing. If courts enforce these agreements,
based on contract law, rather than religious doctrine, government is
not excessively entangled with religion.
C. The Free Exercise Clause
Parties in religiously motivated custody disputes frequently argue that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes the court from denying custody on the basis c ^ religious
belief.24 Parents with atypical religious habits or faiths are especially likely to advance a Free Exercise Clause argument. While
the courts' protection of unpopular or atypical beliefs is admirable,
slavish adherence to the Free Exercise Clause hardly serves the
best interests of children in custody disputes. Courts should not adhere to the Free Exercise Clause when the custodial parent's reli25
gious beliefs threaten the health and well-being of their children.
Clearly, the Constitution prohibits government from restricting religious belief. However, while freedom to believe is absolute,
freedom to act on that belief is not.26 Courts often uphold government restrictions on the free exercise of religion. For example,
courts have upheld the prohibition of polygamy,27 which is practiced not only by some 6,000,000 adherents of the Mormon religion,
but also by the Muslim religion, which has several million adherents in this country. Courts have also recently prohibited the Peyote Indians from using hallucinogenic drugs in their religious
ceremonies. 28 Moreover, courts have ruled that the state's concern
for the health and safety of children supersedes the religious beliefs
of the parent in cases involving blood transfusions for the children
of Jehovah's Witnesses. 29 Clearly, then, free expression of religious
ideas is not an unqualified right. That right is limited, particularly
when the health and welfare of another may be adversely affected.
23. Id. at 613.
24. See, e.g., Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
("First Amendment in conjunction with the Fourteenth solves the problem; it
legally prohibits such religious evaluations.").
25. See Beebe v. Chavez, 602 P.2d 1279, 1291 (Kan. 1979) (citing the Guyana
Massacre in the Jim Jones Cult as an example where a parent's religious beliefs
threatened the health and well-being of the children).
26. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), overruled by Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Secur. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
28. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resource v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
29. E.g., Stapley v. Stapley, 485 P.2d 1181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (custody
changed due to mother's failure to follow court order, which included her refusal to notify father if child needed blood transfusion in order to obtain his
permission).
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This limitation on the free expression of religion can be significant in custody disputes. Where young children may be harmed by
exposure to conflicting religious beliefs, courts have enjoined noncustodial parents from engaging in religious activities with these
children30 However, the threshold at which courts recognize potential harm to the child is a matter of dispute. 31
We have established, at this point, that the free exercise of religion is not an unqualified right, and that courts may impose reasonable limitations on the free exercise of religion. Moreover, in
addition to the limitations that courts may impose on the free exercise of religion to protect a child, the parties themselves voluntarily
impose limitations on their own free exercise of religion by entering
into an antenuptial agreement.
Some courts, however, reject antenuptial agreements on the
ground that religious freedom is an inalienable right, and therefore
cannot be "bargained away." 32 However, Black's Law Dictionary
defines inalienable rights as, "rights, which are not capable of being
surrendered or transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights."3 3 Accordingly, as long as parties enter into an antenuptial agreement voluntarily, enforcement of these agreements
does not violate the principle of inalienability of the right of reli34
gious freedom.
Once again, an analogy may be helpful. The First Amendment
is not limited to religion. It includes freedom of speech as well.
There is no unqualified inalienable right to freedom of speech. For
example, in settling a lawsuit, "A" may agree to give a monetary
settlement to "B," with the proviso that "B" not disclose the
amount of the settlement. Should "B" disclose the figure, he will
forfeit the award. In this instance, "B" has voluntarily imposed
upon himself a limitation on his right to freedom of speech. There
30. Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (noncustodial father
prohibited from taking daughter on door to door religious solicitations).
31. Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (clear affirmative showing that religious activities will be harmful to child); Felton v.
Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981) (detailed demonstration of harm to child);
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("substantial threat"

required, "some probability" of harm not sufficient).

32. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1148.
33. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 683 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
34. Curiously, courts that note the inalienability of religious freedom, e.g.
Zummo, are confused as to which party has the inalienable right. When one
party agrees, in consideration of marriage, that the other party will raise future
children in his or her faith, the first party voluntarily consented to transfer his
or her right to determine the religious upbringing of the children. That right
now belongs to the second party. When the court refuses to enforce the agreement, it is depriving the second party of his or her right to decide the religious
upbringing of the children; this is the parent who possesses the inalienable
rights of both parties. The court takes the right away without the secondparty's
consent.
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are myriad examples of such enforceable voluntary limitations on
speech. For example, when Ross Perot obtained a "divorce" from
the Board of General Motors, he agreed that if he made any negative comments about General Motors' management, he would forfeit a significant portion of the settlement. 5
Voluntarily imposed restrictions on the free expression of
speech are valid and enforceable by the courts. Similarly, voluntarily imposed restrictions on the free expression of religion are also
valid and, in numerous cases, courts have enforced such restrictions.36 It would appear, then, that a court may impose limitations
35. Doren H. Levin, For H. Ross Perot Use of "Free" Speech Could Cost
Millions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,1986, at A3 ("Under terms of agreement with GM,
both parties are forbidden from publicly criticizing each other. Any disputes
over just what constitutes criticism would be decided by a panel of three -rbitrators, who could levy penalties of as much as $7.5 million.").
A more recent example is Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) in which
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the administration could prohibit
physicians, who practice in clinics which are federally supported, from discussing abortion with their patients. The court reasoned that the government has a
right to condition the money it spends, and clinic physicians voluntarily impose
on themselves such conditions. If the physicians are uncomfortable with those
conditions, they are free to practice elsewhere.
36. Butler v. Butler, 132 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (settlement
agreement required child to attend church school enforced even though mother
had difficulty and was inconvenienced in carrying it out); Stern v. Stern, 188
N.E.2d 97 (l1. App. Ct. 1963) (Lutheran mother ordered to remove Jewish born
child from Lutheran school and enroll child in public school); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 175 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (upheld agreement incorporated in divorce decree requiring children be raised Jewish and ordered children be
removed from Catholic school); Wagshal v. Wagshal, 238 A.2d 903 (cd. 1968)
(enforced agreement in divorce decree that child be raised Jewish); Sina v. Sina,
402 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (agreement with provision child be raised
Lutheran and allowing father to expose child to Catholic religion, did not authorize father to expose child to a new, third religion); T. v. H., 245 A.2d 221
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968) (enforced separation agreement that child be
raised Jewish and awarded father custody); Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 183 N.E.
429 (N.Y. 1932) (father ordered to comply with support agreement which he
entered in order to obtain exclusive control over child's religious upbringing);
Smith v. Smith, 545 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (mother ordered to raise
child as Catholics as provided in custody agreement and not in her new religion,
Church of God Eternal); Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, (N.Y. App. Div.
1982) (Catholic mother ordered to remove child from Catholic school because
enrollment conflicted with provision in divorce decree which required express
written permission of both parties for all religious upbringing decisions); Gruber v. Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (custodial father ordered
to enroll child in orthodox jewish religious day school as provided in separation
agreement); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 441 N.Y.S.2d 95, (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (new
custody trial ordered because mother failed to comply with provisions in separation agreement requiring her to observe Jewish dietary law); Gluckstern v.
Gluckstern, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (agreement to raise child as
Jew enforced after Christian Scientist mother began involving child in that religion); S. E. L. v. J. W. W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (Jehovah's
Witness father restricted in extent he could expose child to his religion because
he surrendered custody and all religious training to mother in separation agreement); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1942) (enforced agreement to raise children as Catholics against Protestant mother's wishes).
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on the religious upbringing of a child, when there is a potential for
harm to the child and when an antenuptial agreement has been
violated.
In considering the relationship between the Free Exercise
Clause and the enforcement of antenuptial religious upbringing
agreements, the issue is not the religious belief of the parent. The
parent is free to believe in any faith he or she chooses. Rather, the
issue is the unilateral breach of a commitment made by both parties, as a couple, to raise a child in a specific faith.
D.

Separation of Church and State

There is one additional argument against enforcement of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements. That argument is premised on the phrase "separation of church and state."'37 However, if
37. The phrase "separation of church and state" derives from an address
Thomas Jefferson made in Danbury, Connecticut on January 1, 1802, to a group
of Baptists. The Danbury Baptists wrote to President Jefferson fearful that a
rival Protestant denomination was about to be recognized as the state church of
the United States (much as the Anglican Church is the state church of England). Jefferson reassured his audience, stating, "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between
church and State." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 125 (1878). From the
context in which Jefferson delivered his speech, "Wall of Separation" clearly
meant that the federal government would not establish a state religion.
Jefferson's phrase was first quoted in court by the Mormon Church in 1878,
when that church claimed that the "free exercise of religion," as found in the
First Amendment, and the "separation of church and state," as pronounced by
Jefferson, precluded the federal government from interfering with their religion's polygamy. (The court did not accept these arguments, and outlawed polygamy). Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
The phrase was not presented again in court until 1947, in Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Contrary to conventional wisdom, "separation of
church and state" is found nowhere in the Constitution. The widespread use of
the phrase dates from Everson. In Everson, the court declared "[t]he First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at
18. The Everson court implied that Jefferson's Danbury speech indicated the
intent of the First Amendment framers. It is unclear on what basis the Court
made this assumption. Even if the context of the speech is cast aside, Jefferson
delivered his Danbury speech some thirteen years after Congress passed the
First Amendment. Moreover, Jefferson was neither a member of Congress in
1789, when the First Amendment was framed, nor a delegate to the earlier 1787
Constitutional Convention. Nor was he a member of any state legislature, or
ratifying convention, relevant to the passage of the First Amendment. During
this time, Jefferson was in France, serving as the United States Ambassador.
DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION 42 (1989).
The Court further implied that Jefferson's Danbury speech reflected his
antipathy, if not outright aversion, to religion in governmental or public affairs.
This is a questionable position for the Court to take. It is true that Jefferson (as
opposed to Washington and Adams) refused to issue Thanksgiving proclamations. Lee v.Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). However, while President Jefferson chaired the school board for the District of Columbia, he authored its plan
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enforcement of these agreements violates neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and if
enforcement of these agreements also passes the "neutrality" test
set forth in Lemon, it is unclear how the "separation of church and
state" issue would be relevant. Moreover, as Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has stated, "[t]he wall of separation between church and
state is a metaphor based on bad history. It should be frankly and
explicitly abandoned."3 8 In fact, in matters of neutral contract
principles, there is no such separation. 39
III. CASE LAW
Probably no judicial hearing is as difficult as a contested custody hearing. When the court must also resolve a religious upbringing conflict, the difficulties magnify significantly. Few areas in
either constitutional or natural law overlap in such a volatile way.
It is understandable, then, that some courts attempt to "wash their
hands" of the matter by adopting a judicial philosophy that the religious upbringing portion of the dispute is essentially beyond the
court's jurisdiction, unless there is "clear and convincing demon40
strable evidence of harm" to the child.
A full annotation of religion as a factor in child custody and
of education using the Bible and Watt's Hymnal as reading texts. Morover, in
1803, a year after his Danbury speech, Jefferson recommended to Congress passage of a treaty providing funds to support Catholic missionaries to the Kaskaskia Indians, which they did. Congress enacted similar treaties during
Jefferson's administration, with the Wyandotte Indians in 1806, and with the
Cherokees in 1807. BARTON, supra at 175.
Jefferson was not only a great statesman, but also a great politician. Perhaps the seeming contradiction between Jefferson's Danbury speech and his
support for religion merely reflects political expediency. However, there is little to suggest that Jefferson envisioned the rigid secular philosophy now attributed to him. The First Amendment founders' goal was a secular government,
not a secular society.
38. Nancy Gibler, American Holy War, TME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 63.
39. An item culled from a local community newspaper demonstrates this
point. The California State Attorney General's Office filed a complaint against
David Levi, doing business as Bazar Meats and Poultry, in Los Angeles, for selling non-kosher poultry as kosher. The complaint alleged that the document
Levi displayed in his shop, certifying his products to be kosher, carried an expired date. Only the Rabbinate issues such documents for a fee. The State of
California sought a minimum of $17.500 in penalties. Yale Butler, State Charges
FairfaxAvenue Market with Trafe, B'NAI B'RITH iESSENGER, Sept. 28, 1990, at
1.
There is an anplied contract between the consumer of kosher .r-oducts and
the seller, that those products are, in fact, kosher. Thus, it is most curious that
the State of California will bring to bear its full police powers to enforce an
implied contract on the religious identity of a dead chicken, yet refuse to consider an explicit agreement on the religious identity and upbringing of a young
child.
40. See infra notes 190 through 252 and accompanying text for cases applying the clear and convincing demonstration of harm standard.
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visitation cases can be found elsewhere. 41 The scope of this article
is limited to cases in which the dispute concerns which religion the
child is to be raised in, and how many religions the child is to be
raised in. This article does not address disputes over harm or potential harm to the child from beliefs or practices of particular religions or cults.
To clarify the issues involved, this article examines the case law
in two sections. The first section reviews cases addressing the general question of the enforceability of religious upbringing agreements. The second section reviews cases in which the courts have
applied the "best interests of the child" principle to religious upbringing disputes. Both sections review religious upbringing agreements in contemplation of divorce, as well as those in
contemplation of marriage. Both sections also review disputes in
the context of visitation as well as custody because common principles and issues underlie these disputes.
A. Are Religious UpbringingAgreements Enforceable
by the Courts?
Conventional wisdom holds that courts will not enforce religious upbringing agreements. 42 In fact, however, courts frequently
have enforced such agreements. In fifteen cases a court enforced a
religious upbringing agreement, while in sixteen cases a court declined to enforce such an agreement. As the cases examined below
demonstrate, parties seeking enforcement of religious upbringing
agreements uniformly base their claim on the commitment that the
other parent has broken. The arguments against enforcement, depending on one's point of view, are numerous and scattered.
1.

Cases FavoringEnforcement

Three of the fifteen cases in which a court enforced a religious
upbringing agreement involved antenuptial agreements. In Ramon
v. Ramon,43 a New York trial court enforced a written antenuptial
agreement calling for the children to be raised in the Catholic faith.
The wife, a Protestant married to a Catholic, separated from her
husband and began taking her child to a Protestant church and
Sunday School. The court found that the antenuptial religious upbringing agreement was supported by valid consideration because
the wife's promise to raise the children as Catholics induced the
husband to change his marital status. The court therefore took no41. Russ, supra note 2.
42. See supranote 2 for a discussion of articles on the enforceability of religious upbringing agreements.
43. Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1942).
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tice of the religious and moral obligations of the parties. In enforcing the agreement, the court, quoting Williston on Contracts, noted
that, "[a]greements between parents relating to the religious training of their children are generally upheld." 44 In an earlier New
York case, the court also upheld a parental agreement on the religious upbringing of children as an enforceable contract. 45 Similarly, in Shearer v. Shearer,46 a New York court held that an
antenuptial religious upbringing agreement was an inducing cause
of the marriage and an enforceable contract.
The other cases in which courts enforced religious upbringing
agreements involved separation agreements, divorce decrees, or
custody agreements. In Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,47 the New York
Supreme Court enforced a separation agreement which gave the father full authority over the religious education of the children, allowing the father to raise a child in the Jewish faith. The court
found that the mother, who had remarried and converted to the
Church of Christian Scientist, had "greatly influenced the child's
thinking," causing the child to wish to become a Christian Scientist.48 The court found the mother in contempt of court and fined
her. In Butler v. Butler,49 a Florida court enforced a religious upbringing agreement which was part of a divorce decree. In Gottlieb
v. Gottlieb,50 the Appellate Court of Illinois upheld an agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree requiring that the children be
raised in the Jewish faith. The mother, a Catholic, ignored the
agreement and enrolled the children in Catholic schools. Similarly,
in Stern v. Stern,5 1 an Illinois court upheld a religious upbringing
agreement that was part of a divorce decree.
In T. v. H.,52 a provision in a separation agreement that the children were to be brought up in the Jewish faith was an important
factor in a New Jersey court's award of custody to the father. After
the divorce, the mother married a Gentile and moved to western
Idaho where there were few Jews and few facilities necessary to
cultivate the Jewish faith in the children. The Maryland Supreme
44. Id. at 111.
45. Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 183 N.E. 429 (N.Y. 1932) (father ordered to
comply with support agreement which he entered in order to obtain exclusive
control over child's religious upbringing).
46. Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (children
were to be raised in religion of father, Roman Catholic, as wife agreed in prenuptial agreement).
47. Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961).
48. Id. at 624.
49. Butler v. Butler, 132 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
50. Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 175 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
51. Stern v. Stern, 188 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
52. T. v. H., 245 A.2d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
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Court in Wagshal v. Wagsal,5 3 also enforced a religious upbringing agreement, finding that a chancellor erred in striking from a
proposed divorce decree a provision, which the parties had agreed
upon, that the child was to be raised in the Jewish faith. The court
stated that religious upbringing agreements are desirable and
should be encouraged.
In Peristein v. Perlstein,54 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, vacated a declaration of custody, reinstated a father's custody petition, and ordered a new trial on the issue of
custody, because the mother failed to comply with a provision in the
separation agreement that required her to raise the child in a home
observant of Jewish dietary law. The separation agreement stated,
"[t]he wife agrees to strictly limit the food served at home according
to Jewish dietary laws. Her continuous violation of this paragraph
shall immediately revert the custody of the child to the father." 55
The trial court dismissed the father's petition and declared the
mother "sole custodian" of the child. However, the appellate division reinstated the father's petition stating:
Nor is the finding that the child had adjusted well to the non-orthodox
lifestyle his mother fostered dispositive. When neither party has a special claim or right to custody, the well-being of the child is the sole
denominator of his best interests. But, when, as here, the parties have
agreed upon an appropriate standard of religious upbringing, both interests, the child's and the parents' as regards his moral and religious
training, must be weighed and, where possible, reconciled. Thus, in the
circumstances of this case, the principle adopted by Trial Term that a
change in custody is justified only if conditions are so bad as seriously
to affect health or morals (citations omitted) is not controlling. 56
Despite finding the mother to be a fit parent, the appellate division
found as a matter of law that, "the mother was obligated to show
that the observance of the religious guidelines specified in the separation agreement was detrimental to the child, since it was the father who sought to uphold the terms of the separation
agreement." 57 The court found that the child's mother failed to
show that adherence to the religious guidelines had been or would
be detrimental to the child.
[The father] has met his burden of proving that the custody provisions
of the agreement were violated, and [the mother] has failed to show
that the rights of both parents concerning custody should not be governed by the separation agreement. Therefore, it is the obligation of
53. Wagshal v. Wagshal, 238 A.2d 903 (Md. 1968).
54. Perlstein v. Perlstein, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).

55. Id. at 898.

56. Id. at 900.
57. Id. at 901.
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the court to enforce the agreement in accordance with its terms5 8s
In Spring v. Glawon,5 9 a Catholic custodial mother enrolled her
child in a Catholic elementary school, over the objections of the
child's Jewish noncustodial father, and in violation of a divorce decree that stated, "this child shall have no religious upbringing without the express written permission of both parties."6 The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, ordered the mother to remove the child from the parochial school, and to enroll the child in
a public or non-sectarian private school. 61 The trial court decision,
affirmed by the appellate court, stated:
The court should not substitute its judgment as to what is in the best
interest of the child, when it is contrary to the parental agreement,
unless the party seeking modification can clearly demonstrate to the
court's satisfaction that enforcement would not be in the best interest
of the child. This is so regardless of when the agreement was made.
Defendant must therefore prove that it would be in the infant
child's best interest to modify the agreement so as to permit his continued enrollment in the parochial school without his father's approval
The defendant mother, as custodial parent, has contracted away a
valuable right; the right to determine the religious upbringing of her
child without restriction. The court will not rewrite that contract
62

The Spring trial court also noted, "[o]ccasionally, the courts have
sought to distinguish between ante-nuptial agreements requiring
the religious upbringing of children and agreements made in contemplation of a divorce, holding the former not binding (citation
omitted) although this court can see no substantive difference be63
tween the two."
In Gruber v. Gruber,64 the New York Appellate Court ordered
a custodial father to enroll his children in a yeshiva (an orthodox
Jewish religious day school), as provided in the separation agreement. The court stated, "no reason appears why the provisions of
the contract should be ignored." 65 The Gruber court further noted,
that "the party in breach of the agreement should bear the burden
of demonstrating that adherence to the agreement would be detrimental to the interests of the child."' 66
58. Perlstein v. Perlstein, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2230, 2231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982).
59. Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
60. Id. at 141.
61. Id.
62. Spring v. Glawon, 8 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2283, 2284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
63. Id. at 2283.
64. Gruber v. Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
65. Id. at 122.
66. Id. at 120.
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In Sina v. Sina,67 a divorce decree provided that the children
would be raised in the Lutheran faith of the mother, but could be
exposed to the Catholic faith of the father. The father, however,
subsequently joined another denomination. The mother objected to
submitting the children to yet a third religion, and the Minnesota
trial court concurred, stating that "exposure... to a third religion
will result in confusion and dilution of their basic religious training
....,,68 The Minnesota Appellate Court affirmed the decision. 69
In S. E. L. v. J. W. W. 7 a Jehovah's Witness father agreed in
the stipulated settlement, incorporated into the divorce decree, that
the mother was to have absolute custody and exclusive supervision,
control, and care of their daughter. He was, therefore, restricted by
a New York trial court in the extent to which he could expose the
child to his religion. The court noted that when he surrendered
"exclusive supervision, control and care" to his wife, he "waived his
right to the 'free exercise' of his religion" when his daughter visited
him.7 "He assumed the onus of demonstrating that allowing him
to expose Natalie [his daughter] to his religion would not be harm72
ful to her."
In Smith v. Smith,73 a New York trial court ordered a custodial
mother to honor a clause in her decree-incorporated custody agreement that provided for her children to be brought up in the Roman
Catholic faith. The court ordered her to refrain from raising her
children in her new religion, the Church of God Eternal. The court
noted that because the mother had clearly agreed that the children
would be raised as Catholics, she could not interfere with their religious upbringing. The trial court stated:
[B]ecause the mother unequivocally agreed that the children were to
be raised as Catholics she cannot do anything to hinder their religious
upbringing. [B]y requiring the children to observe her Sabbath (Friday
evening through Saturday evening) and attend Sabbath services in her
home, she has effectively forced them to practice a religion other than
Catholicism.7 4
In several cases the courts, in allowing the custodial parent to
determine the religious upbringing of the children, implied that had
there been an agreement, a different decision might have been
reached. 75 In the foregoing cases, courts upheld several kinds of
67. Sina v. Sina, 402 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
68. Id. at 576.
69. Id. at 577.

70. S.E. L. v. J. W. W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1989).
71. Id. at 679.
72. Id.
73. Smith v. Smith, 17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1024, 1024 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990).
74. Id.
75. See Appelbaum v. Haines, 284 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (in absence

of agreement to contrary, custodial parent determines religious training);
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religious upbringing agreements. These courts based their decisions upon contract principles. However, each court considered the
child's well-being as a potentially dispositive factor and allowed the
parties to show that the enforceability or non-enforceability of the
agreement could harm the child.
2. Case Law Against Enforcement
Courts which have found antenuptial religious upbringing
agreements unenforceable have set forth several different arguments. The most potent of these is that in a particularcase, enforcement conflicts with the best interests of the child. This
reasoning cannot be faulted. As the following cases demonstrate,
however, arguments which deny enforcement of religious upbringing agreements on grounds of general principle, rather than on a
case by case basis, lack credible reasoning. Courts have developed
no clearly discernable pattern in these decisions. Therefore, the
cases are grouped on the basis of the primary argument underlying
the decision. Although such a grouping results in considerable
overlap, this approach provides a more focused overview of the arguments courts employ to deny enforcement of religious upbringing
contracts.
a. Arguments Based on Constitutional Grounds
In Brewer v. Cary,76 the Missouri Court of Appeals refused to
enforce an antenuptial agreement on the religious upbringing of an
infant, because enforcement would require the court to choose between religions. As the Brewer court stated:
Nor can we, in determining what is for the welfare of the infant, determine that on considerations of religion. That would involve our determination between religions - and we are not permitted to do that. To
do so would be a determination by the courts as to differences
in reli77
gious belief, which is incompatible with religious freedom.
In contending that enforcement of the religious upbringing
agreement would compel the court to prefer one religion over another, the Brewer court exaggerated its role. The court's only task
was to acknowledge the existence of a contract freely entered into
by two consenting adults. The court was not required to discuss
theology or religious differences, nor to determine the superiority,
value, correctness, or spirituality of any religion relative to another.
Mester v. Mester, 296 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (without an agreement
between the parties as to children's religious training, custodial parent controls); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 205 A.2d 49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) (absent contractual agreement between parents as to child's religion, court presumes that
religious training follows the custodial parent).

76. Brewer v. Cary, 127 S.W. 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910).
77. Id. at 692.
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8
In McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,7
the Connecticut Superior
Court refused to enforce an antenuptial contract that provided for
the children to be raised in their father's faith. The McLaughlin
court also refused to support the father's petition to enforce the
children's religious upbringing by granting him custody of the children. The court argued that, "[a] court will not take a child's religious education into its own hands short of circumstances
amounting to unfitness of the custodian, and in a dispute relating to
custody, religious views afford no ground for removing children
from the custody of a parent otherwise qualified." 79 The McLaughlin court argued that no person should be compelled to join or be
associated with any particular church or religious association. The
court also asserted that the law is absolutely impartial on matters of
religion.

On the surface, the issues in McLaughlin were clear cut. While
a court can order a custodial parent to raise a child in the religion of
the other parent, by requiring the custodial parent to enroll the
child in the noncustodial parent's church education program and
requiring that parent to transport or otherwise make the child
available for church services, there are tensions inherent in such a
scheme. Consequently, few courts look on such a plan with much
enthusiasm. A specific religious upbringing can also be effected by
a change of custody, but a court would be particularly hesitant to
remove a child from a custodial parent on religious grounds, when
the custodial parent's religious views were traditional and "mainstream." Also, once a court vests custody in a parent, it is far more
difficult to reverse that decision and grant custody to the other
parent.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, several inconsistencies appear
in the McLaughlin court's reasoning. The McLaughlin court stated
that the court should not compel a person to join or to be associated
with any particular church. However, the custodial parent in McLaughlin was not being so compelled. It was the child who was to
attend the church school and go to the church services, not the
mother. The court stated in McLaughlin that religious views afford
no ground for changing custody. However, the religious views of
the custodial parent were not at issue. The custodial parent was
free to believe in whatever religion she desired. Rather, her religious actions were at issue. Raising the child in her religion instead
of the father's religion violated her commitment in the antenuptial
agreement. The McLaughlin court stated that it would not take a
child's religious education "into its own hands," short of unfitness
78. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 132 A.2d 420 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957).

79. Id. at 422.
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of the custodian.8 0 However, under the antenuptial agreement, the
custodial parent had already placed the direction of the child's religious upbringing into the hands of the noncustodial parent. Therefore, the court was not being asked to take the child's religious
education "into its own hands." Instead, the noncustodial parent
asked the court to recognize the existence of a contract on the
child's religious upbringing. The net effect of the McLaughlin
court's refusal to act is no less potent than affirming the contract
would have been.
Although the McLaughlin court declared the law to be "absolutely impartial" on religious matters,8 1 many courts do not act impartially. Were these courts impartial on matters of religion, they
would analyze antenuptial religious upbringing agreements on neutral contract principles, as they would any other contract, and they
would enforce religious upbringing contracts subject only to the
best interests of the child. "Impartial" (or "neutral") is, therefore,
an inaccurate description of the courts' attitude toward religion.
"Indifferent"8 2 is a far more accurate characterization. In being indifferent to antenuptial religious upbringing agreements, the courts
consign these contracts to illegality. The suggestion that deliberate
and selective withholding of the rule of law from religious upbringing disputes represents impartiality toward religion is specious.
The above objections to the court's reasoning notwithstanding, if
the children's interests were best served by allowing their mother
to retain custody, (and there is nothing in the opinion to suggest
that this was not the case), the McLaughlin court came to the correct decision.
In Hackett v. Hackett,8 3 the Court of Appeals of Ohio found unenforceable, portions of a separation agreement that had been
adopted by a court decree. The separation agreement provided that
the parties' daughter would be reared in the Roman Catholic faith
exclusively, that she would take her first communion, be confirmed, and attend all services as prescribed by the church. The
agreement also stated that the daughter would attend a particular
Catholic elementary school, or one of the same order. Despite the
agreement, however, the mother, a Protestant, removed the child
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Black's Law Dictionary defines impartial as "favoring neither, disinterested; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair, and just." BLACK's LAw DicAll courts, in all cases, are presumed to be
TIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1979).
impartial.
Indifferent has several distinct meanings and, in the context taken here,
means "not mattering one way or the other; of no great importance; having no
particular interest or concern; apathetic." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIoNARY

655 (2d ed. 1982).
83. Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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from the Catholic school and enrolled her in a public school. The
court refused to enforce the agreement, stating that "religious doctrine [is] a matter of personal choice uncontrolled by law or decree
of a court. Nor can the free choice of religious practices be circumscribed or controlled by contract."84 The Hackett court also stated,
citing Boerger v. Boerger,s5 that the custodial parent must be the
one to determine the child's religious upbringing.
Like the McLaughlin court, the court in Hackett offers a specious argument when it states that, "religious doctrine [is] a matter
of personal choice uncontrolled by law or [court] decree."86 Again,
the issue is not the religious doctrine of the custodial parent. That
parent is free to believe in any religious belief he or she sees fit. On
the contrary, the issue is the religious indoctrinationof the child.
This is hardly a matter of "personal choice" for a seven year old
child, who is incapable of such a choice. Nor is it by "law or [court]
decree" that the child's religious identity and direction are set, but
instead by a solemn commitment made by the parent now seeking
to break that commitment. Neither "law [n]or [court] decree" has
ever created the religion of a child de novo. The only "controlling"
factors should be the best interests of the child and the reliance
which the other parent had placed on the religious upbringing commitment. The Hackett court also stated, "[n]or can the free choice
87
of religious practices be circumscribed or controlled by contract."
However, a contract can circumscribe or control the right to proselytize. For instance, a parochial school may bar proselytizing by a
teacher of another faith, who was hired to teach a secular subject.
Also, as the court stated in S. E. L. v. J W. W.,88 "rights of constitutional dimension can be freely waived."
In Brown v. Szakal,8 9 a mother born and reared as a Catholic,
converted to Judaism prior to marrying a Catholic. The parties
married in a Catholic ceremony and their children were baptized
and attended Catholic mass. When she subsequently divorced her
husband, the settlement agreement provided that the mother would
have custody of the children and "primary responsibility for their
religious upbringing."9 The father temporarily left the country to
work in Saudi Arabia. On his return, he found that his former wife
had married an orthodox Jew, had taken up that faith, and was raising his children, now ages six and three, as orthodox Jews. The
mother refused to allow the father to visit the children on the Jew84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 433.
Boerger v. Boerger, 97 A.2d 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953).
Hackett, 150 N.E.2d at 433.
Id.
S. E. L. v. J. W. W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989).
Brown v. Szakal, 514 A.2d. 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
Id. at 82.
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ish Sabbath, chastised the children for eating non-kosh? er food while
visiting with their father, and berated the father for giving them
non-kosher food.
Initially, the Superior Court of New Jersey required the father
to comply with the mother's demands that he not transgress Jewish
dietary laws or Sabbath laws during his visitation. The father
sought to have the court's order vacated, arguing that "to require
him to obey all Jewish Sabbath and dietary laws while visiting with
his children would violate his constitutional rights in that the court
as a state entity would be doing an affirmative act in support of an
organized religion." 91 The court agreed, noting that "the mother
has by contract with defendant sole authority to choose the religion
of their children. But she cannot, through this court as a state
agency, constitutionally impose the practice of her beliefs and those
of the children upon her former husband." 92
The court, with some understatement, also noted that:
Plaintiff created a personal pluralism by leaving the religion of her
parents and choosing her present faith. She is twice married - giving
her children a natural father and a stepfather. In spite of the foregoing
voluntarily obtained dichotomies, the mother would have the children
encapsulated and shielded from all alien influences even if those influences are those of the children's natural father.... It is suggested that
... she opts for self interest which here must yield to the welfare of...
93
the father and the children, particularly.
The Brown court's decision was correct. Had the court acceded to
the mother's demands, the Catholic father, despite his marriage to
the mother in a Catholic ceremony and despite his children's baptism in the Catholic faith, would have been required to practice the
tenets of orthodox Judaism.
b. Arguments Based on the Best Interests of the Child
In several cases, courts refused to enforce religious upbringing
agreements because enforcement was inimical to the best interests
of the child. In Boergerv. Boerger,94 the court refused to enforce an

antenuptial agreement that the children would be raised in the
Catholic faith of their noncustodial father. In permitting the
mother to raise the children as Lutherans, the New Jersey Superior
Court noted that the children's training in the Catholic faith had
ended when they were four to six years old. The Boerger court
found that a religious change at these ages did not have a harmful
effect on the children. The Boerger court also noted that "[it would
91. Id.
92. Id. at 83.
93. Id. at 84-85.
94. Boerger v. Boerger, 97 A.2d 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953).
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be] psychologically [un]desirable for the child[ren] to be exposed to
the conflicting desires of [their] parents ... [as to their religious]
training,"9 5 as they were when the father took the children to Catholic services each Sunday, after the children had already attended
Lutheran services with their mother.
In Martin v. Martin,96the New York Appellate Court modified
and refused to enforce an antenuptial agreement between a noncustodial Catholic father and a custodial Christian Scientist mother,
requiring that the child be raised Catholic. Because the boy had
reached the age of twelve, the court held that he "had a mind of his
own and because failure to amend the decree would strip him of his
'97
independent judgment in matters of this kind.
In Stanton v. Stanton,98 a Georgia court refused to enforce an
antenuptial contract that the children be raised in the faith of their
father even if custody were granted to the mother, holding that the
childrens' best interests outweighed the antenuptial agreement.
The father conceded that the mother was a good parent. The court
noted that "parents cannot by contract relating to the religious
training of their children restrict the discretion of the court in
awarding custody, and the court may disregard entirely any such
contract."
The court also noted that "[generally], the welfare of
the child is the controlling fact in determining the right to its custody,and... contracts between the parents concerning the religious
training of their children will not be enforced, and the parent to
whom custody is awarded is not bound by a previous contract [relating to religious training]."' 00 Stanton thus argues that custody
should be determined according to the best interests of a child,
rather than by an antenuptial contract of any nature, religious or
otherwise. Furthermore, once sole custody has been determined, it
is impractical to require the custodial parent of one religion to raise
the children in another religion.
In Hehman v. Hehman,10 1 the New York Appellate Court refused to enforce an antenuptial agreement which required that one
child be raised in a faith different from the faith of the child's siblings residing in the same household. The antenuptial agreement
and divorce decrees permitted a noncustodial father to continue to
raise his son in the Lutheran faith, providing for visitation on Sundays. The boy's custodial mother was a Catholic and she was raising
95. Id. at 426.
96. Martin v. Martin, 127 N.Y.S.2d 851, aff'd 123 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1954).

97. Id.
98. Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1957).

99. Id. at 293.
100. Id. at 292.
101. Hehman v. Hehman, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. App. Term. 1958).
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his brother and sister as Catholics. The mother began taking the
boy to a Catholic church and planned to enroll him in a Catholic
school. The father protested and sought to enforce the antenuptial
agreement. The New York Appellate Court considered the welfare
of the child noting that "arbitrarily to assign different religious upbringing to children of the same household is certainly not leaving
them unmolested."'10 2 Thus, the court would not enforce the
agreement.
In Miles v. Liebolt,'0 3 the New York Appellate Court refused to
enforce an antenuptial agreement on the religious upbringing of
two children, ages five and seven. In Miles, the custodial mother
remarried into another religion and was raising her ch'ldren in the
faith of her new husband and his children. The Miles court stated
that:
[Tihe paramount consideration at this time is the continuance of the
happy family life now enjoyed by the children... [which would be
disrupted by the exercise of a compulsion that the children be distinguished from the others with whom they reside in the manner of their
religious upbringing]. This is not to minimize the importance of the
agreement made between the parties. Were the circumstances not
such that enforcement would wreck 1°4
injury upon the children, a direction to carry it out would be proper.
In O'Neil v. O'Neil, 0 5 the New York Appellate Court refused
to enforce an antenuptial agreement which would require changing
the religion of a seven year old child. In O'Neil, the Jewish custodial mother was raising her child as a Jew, despite an antenuptial
agreement that any children of the marriage would be raised in the
Catholic faith. The father sought to have the child enrolled in a
Roman Catholic school. Noting the psychological harm that would
result in changing the child's religion, the O'Neil court stated that,
"the problem [is] not determined by consideration of the law of contracts. Rather, the determinative consideration must be the welfare
of the child."' °6
c. Arguments Based on the Custodial Parent's Right to
Determine the Religious Upbringing of the Child
In addition to looking at the child's best interests, one court, in
refusing to uphold an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement,
looked to which parent had custody and found that that parent held
the right to determine the religious upbringing of the child,
notwithstanding any agreements which the parties entered into. In
102. Id. at 330.
103. Miles v. Liebolt, 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. App. Term. 1962).

104. Id. at 344.
105. O'Neil v. O'Neil, 255 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).

106. Id. at 778.
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Wo~fert v. Wofert,1 0 7 the Colorado Appellate Court refused to require a custodial parent to honor an antenuptial agreement which
provided the children would be raised in the religion of the noncustodial parent. The Wo~fert court observed that state law gives the
custodial parent the right to determine the religious training of
children. The court also found that the parties presented no evidence to show that raising the children in the custodial parent's
religion had significantly impaired the children's physical health or
emotional development.
The Wolfert court's approach is valid, provided that the court
considered the religious upbringing dispute when it determined custody. However, if the court had not considered religious upbringing
when it awarded custody, the court would have abrogated the rights
of the noncustodial parent, who lost his or her right to raise the
children in his or her religion. As such, this would constitute a
change of circumstances warranting a reassessment (but not necessarily a change) of custody.
d. Argument Based on Religious Law
Religious law played a pivotal role in the New York Appellate
Court's decision not to enforce an antenuptial religious agreement
in Schwarzman v. Schwarzman.108 In Schwarzman, a Jewish father sought to enjoin his former wife from changing the religion of
their children. Prior to marriage, the wife converted from Catholicism to Judaism, but following their divorce she returned to Catholicism and raised their children as Catholics. When the couple
married, the wife was in an early stage of pregnancy and she converted to the Jewish faith as a precondition to the marriage. The
conversion instruction and the conversion took place within the Reform branch of Judaism. The father claimed that his four daughters were Jewish, first, as a result of his oral antenuptial agreement
with their mother, and second, because of the daughters' ritual induction into the Jewish faith (apparently in a naming ceremony).
The New York Appellate Court felt the father's contention obligated the court to determine whether the children were actually
Jewish, in order to ascertain "the validity of the children's rights, if
any, to be brought up within their own religious identity."1 0 9 In
reaching this determination, the court relied on Halacha, orthodox
Jewish law. The court noted that in her conversion by the Reform
rabbi, the mother did not undergo an immersion in a Mikvah (a
Jewish ritual bath). Despite the fact that Reform Judaism does not
require such an immersion to effect conversion, the court stated
107. Wolfert v. Wolfert, 598 P.2d 524 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
108. Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).

109. Id. at 996.
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that, "[u]nder strict Halachic interpretation, she never attained the
status of a Jewish woman which would entitle her progeny to claim
a Jewish heritage by birth."110
In further evaluating whether the children were Jewish, the
court also noted the sworn testimony of the mother who stated:
[T]hat she never intended a true conscientious conversion from the
faith of her birth, that she acceded to the pressure imposed up.n her
by the plaintiff at a time ... [of] great anxiety, in the early stages of
pregnancy and unmarried, that she never truly adopted Judaism as her
faith, and that upon the termination of this marriage, she returned eagerly and wholeheartedly to her original Roman Catholic Church: 111
The court then stated, "[t]here is Rabbinical authority, both Orthodox and Reform for the proposition that a convert who denies the
intention to have become a true convert and renounces the Jewish
faith... annuls the conversion by that fact alone ab initio, as having been made in bad faith."'112 On the basis of Jewish law, the
court concluded that "for whatever it is worth, the children of this
mother cannot claim a Jewish birthright nor can the father claim it
for them as a matter of religious law." 113
The decision in Schwarzman shows confusion in several respects. In negating the validity of a conversion in Reform Judaism,
because it did not meet Orthodox Judaism's standards, the
Schwarzman court negated the validity of Reform Judaism. This is
constitutionally impermissible. Likewise, the court erred in questioning whether the children were actually Jews under Halachic
law. Notwithstanding the father's statement that the children were
Jews, the issue before the court was whether there was an agreement that the children were to be raised as Jews.
The opinion in Schwarzman does not state whether the
rabbinical law annulling conversions made in bad faith ab initio
represents a minority position or a consensus of rabbinical opinion.
Regardless, it is unclear why a promise made in bad faith should
automatically release the promisor. Moreover, it was the father
who relied on the "promise" represented by his prospective wife's
conversion, not the rabbinate. Finally, the actual promise was the
wife's agreement to raise the children in the Jewish faith; her conversion to Judaism merely provided supporting evidence of that
promise. As the Schwarzman court itself noted, "[ilt is not denied
by the mother that in contemplation of the marriage... she agreed
with the plaintiff that the children of the marriage would be reared
1 14
as Jews."
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
114. Id. at 998.
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On neutral contract principles, the defendant wife might have
argued that the antenuptial religious upbringing agreement was not
a binding contract because she made the agreement under duress,
due to her pregnancy. However, the Schwarzman court did not
mention this argument.
The Schwarzman court was further disingenuous in concluding
that the mother was not engaged in "changing the religion of the
children.""15 As the court expressed it, "[s]he and her second husband apparently attend church regularly and have begun to bring
the children or some of them to church and instructing their children in the Catholic religious practices and dogma.""16 The court
also held that the religious upbringing agreement was not controlling because the parties had not made the agreement in contemplation of divorce. Such reasoning is examined below in the discussion
of Stevenot v. Stevenot."17 Despite such muddled thinking, however, the Schwarzman court came to the correct decision. The parties in Schwarzman did not contest the award of custody to the
mother. Since the mother was to retain custody of the children, it
would have been impractical and divisive for the court to require
115. Id. at 999-1000.
116. Id. at 995.
117. Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). The court
in Schwarzman did not appear favorably disposed to the father. The court
stated the following:.
The father has urged that the court interview the oldest child or the oldest
two children (10 and 8) to determine their religious preference, in order to
assist the court to come to a conclusion in this case. This court carefully
observed the attitudes of mother and father during the course of the hearing. It is clear that the father utilizes his visitation time to proselytize with
the children, admonishing them that they are Jews, that their mother is
doing a sinful thing by taking them to her Church and that they will suffer
the fires of hell if they accede to their mother's religious indoctrination.
The foolishness of the father's attitude will become more evident as these
children grow in this divisive and destructive atmosphere .... The tragedy
of these children being torn apart by a vindictive and insensitive father are
the consequences of his own acts and he cannot redeem himself on earth or
in heaven by inflicting his religious views. . . upon these hapless infants. If
he continues this campaign of terror against his own children, it is not difficult to foresee that their lives and their personalities will be irreparably
damaged in this world. Accordingly, this court will decline to interview the
children of such tender years since we are of the view that they are not
capable, competent or free enough to make such a choice at this time.
Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S. 2d at 998-99. It is unfortunate this court elected not to
interview the two older children because, without benefit of the trial court transcripts, the mother's allegations against the father appear suspect. Judaism
does not believe in Hell nor do Jews generally use such verbiage as "suffer the
fires of hell." PAUL SILVERMAN, JUDAISM AND CHRISTIAN=TY 197 (1968). A central tenet of Judaism is that God judges people for their actions, not for their
religions. Therefore, Jewish principles have never held that anyone would
"suffer the fires of hell" because they were Christian. Moreover, the father was
from the liberal Reform branch of Judaism. Consequently, either this father
was remarkably ignorant of his faith's tenets, or the court was ignorant of the
events which actually transpired in the family.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:655

the custodial parent of one faith to raise the children in another
faith.
e. Arguments Based on the Failure to Contemplate Divorce and
the Statute of Frauds
In Stevenot v. Stevenot,11 8 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, denied a husband's attempt to enforce an oral antenuptial agreement requiring his former wife to raise their two
children in the faith of the Congregational Church. The Stevenot
court held that the oral agreement on the children's religious upbringing, which the parties had made prior to their marriage and
reiterated during their marriage, was not binding because it had not
been reduced to a writing and because it did not contemplate a postdivorce status.
Even if the antenuptial agreement had been in writing, the
Stevenot court would not have enforced the contract because it did
not contemplate a post-divorce status. There are difficulties with
this reasoning. The agreement to raise the children in the Congregational faith was made in consideration of marriage. Thus, the
husband performed his part of the bargain by marrying his wife.
The Stevenot court's position that the wife was released from her
commitment when the court dissolved the marriage is unfounded.
Such reasoning assumes that the husband was at fault in the failure
of the marriage and that he was the party who breached this "contract." However, if the marriage had failed solely as a result of the
wife's actions, would the Stevenot court still have released the wife
from her contractual commitment on the religious upbringing of
the children? How would the Stevenot reasoning apply under "no
fault" divorce provisions?
The Stevenot court's reasoning misinterprets contract law.
Under Stevenot, a wife who promises to raise the children in the
faith of the father, as part of the bargain for marriage, can later
renege on that solemn promise by breaking up the marriage. She
can then claim she no longer has any obligation to raise the children
in their father's faith. Instead, she can raise the children in the religion of her choosing, because the breakup of the marriage constitutes the father's "withdrawal" of his "consideration."
Such reasoning raises many problems. Obligations incurred
before and during marriage do not abruptly and arbitrarily cease
with the dissolution of the marriage. For example, a husband pays
"spousal support" for many years because his financial obligations
to his wife do not cease with termination of the marriage. Yet, unlike the religious upbringing obligation, post-divorce spousal sup118. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197.
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port is not usually an issue raised prior to a marriage, nor is it likely
an obligation on which the parties relied at the time the marriage
was agreed to.
The Stevenot court also found the agreement unenforceable as
violating the statute of frauds. Although Stevenot is one of only two
cases in which a court invoked the statute of frauds, it is likely one
of the stronger arguments against enforcement of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements. Therefore, the statute of frauds warrants closer analysis.
The other case in which a court used the statute of frauds to
render an oral antenuptial agreement unenforceable is Kellner v.
Kellner.n 9 In Kellner, two people of different faiths agreed prior to
marriage that they would marry in the husband's faith, adhere to
that faith and raise their children in that faith. For a time, the wife
raised the children in the husband's faith, but then began raising
the children in her own faith. The father brought an action to enforce the agreement after the parties had been separated for five
years. At this time, the children were in the mother's custody. The
mother argued that the court should dismiss the complaint because,
"it seeks to compel performance of an asserted promise made orally
in consideration of marriage which the law says is enforceable only
when committed to writing."'120 The New York Supreme Court dismissed the father's complaint noting, "that the Legislature provided
that an agreement such as this should be void unless in writing and
subscribed by those sought to be bound thereto. Whatever the motivation, the prohibition is a proper exercise of the Legislative func121
tion in the field of public policy."'
The statute of frauds, which was adopted in England in 1676,
requires that certain agreements be reduced to writing to be enforceable. 122 Under the statute of frauds, any agreement made in
consideration of marriage must be reduced to a writing. An oral
agreement under the statute is not invalid, but it is
unenforceable.m2S
Apparently, in Kellner, the wife did not formally convert to her
husband's religion. However, the statute of frauds may be a less
119. Kellner v. Kellner, 90 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).
120. Id. at 744 (citing New York personal property law as support for her
argument).

121. Id. at 745.
122. The statute of frauds, however, did not apply to religious upbringing
disputes, as the operating doctrine at that time and until the 1880's was "religion sequiturpatrem." The father held the right to determine the religious
upbringing and education of the child. Lee M. Friedman, The ParentalRight to
Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARv. L. REV. 485, 495 nn.37-38
(1916).
123. SAMUEL WILLISTON

§ 527 (rev. ed. 1936).

& GEORGE

J. THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
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significant bar to the enforcement of religious upbringing agreements in marriages in which one spouse has formally converted to
the faith of the other. In such marriages, there is usually a writing
signifying the spouse's religious conversion. If that writing includes
a commitment to raise the parties' future children in that particular
faith, the writing serves to validate the oral religious upbringing
agreement, making it enforceable. It is well established that a properly signed writing can render an oral antenuptial agreement enforceable, even when the writing was executed subsequent to the
oral agreement and subsequent to the marriage. 24 Moreover, even
if the writing fails to make express reference to the prior oral
agreement, the writing removes the oral agreement from the statute of frauds. 125 As Williston has stated, "[lt is even said that the
only effect of the statute is to require certain evidence in order to
26
prove the bargain.'
Such protection will likely not be present, however, in a marriage of parties who initially shared the same faith and married in
that same faith, if one of the parties subsequently abandons that
faith. There is no "paper trail" in such marriages because religious
identity of the family was already assumed. Nor should such a "paper trail" have been necessary. It would be as unnatural for the
religious character of the marriage to be set to paper as it would be
for the sexual character of the marriage to be set to paper. On such
essentials of a marriage, there is a presumed and express agreement
as regards religion that the parties ratify when they are married in
a ceremony of their common faith. Application of the statute of
frauds in such an instance effectively prevents a non-changing parent from maintaining the religious upbringing and identity of his or
127
her children.
The incongruous nature of applying the statute of frauds
should be fully appreciated. It is only the parent who has "played
124. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UN TED STATES 2 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Ayoob v. Ayoob, 168 P.2d 462 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1946); Lee v. Central Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 308 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. 1974); In
re Estate of Weber, 167 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio 1960)).

125. Ayoob, 168 P.2d 462.
126. WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 123.
127. The statute of frauds, as regards promises in consideration of marriage,
clearly was intended to apply to monetary, and not religious upbringing
promises. Historical and social situations contemporaneous with the time
evince this intent:
[In England,] [a]s early as 1590 the Elizabethan government aimed at the
suppression of Catholic education by enacting that only schoolmasters who
repaired to the Established Church might be maintained, (citation omitted)
followed four years later by a further statute which punished as a
proemunire the sending abroad of a child for Catholic education. (citation
omitted). From time to time further laws were passed (citations omitted)
to render more effectual the suppression of Catholic education, until by
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by the rules," by assuming the burdens and obligations of marriage
before beginning a family, who finds himself or herself without any
rights to maintain the children's faith. Ironically, the law affords
considerably more protection to the rights of the parties in "meretricious relationships," such as unmarried and cohabiting, as in
1699 it was a crime punishableby perpetualimprisonmentfor any Papist to
keep school or assume the education of youth. (citation omitted)
Naturallyduring this period,in the face of such publicsentiment and
of such laws there was little or no litigationin the courts ofEngland on the
part of Catholicparents to protect any parentalrights in relation to their
children. Indeed the temper of the courts, reflecting this prevalent spirit of
religious intolerance, is well illustrated by their action in Shaftsbury v.
Hannam, (citation omitted) where upon an insinuation by counsel for the
plaintiff that the defendant was a Papist, although "utterly denied" by her,
an order was entered that unless Lady Hannam "dispose herself to receive
the Sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England, before the
end of the next term, and produce a legal certificate thereof, the court
would then consider to remove the infant into such hands as might secure
his education in the Protestant religion."
Friedman, supra note 122, at 485-86. (emphasis added).
Calamari describes the statute of frauds in the following manner.
In 1677 Parliament enacted an Act for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries. (citations omitted). This Statute contained twenty-five sections which
dealt with conveyances, wills, trusts, judgment and execution in addition to
contracts. (citations omitted). Only two sections, the fourth and the seventeenth are important for contract purposes. These sections read as follows:
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That from and after the said four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought (1) whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise, to answer damages out of his own
estate; (2) or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special
promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another
person; (3) or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon
consideration of marriage; (4) or upon any contract for sale of lands,
tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them;
(5) or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the
space of one year from the making thereof; (6) unless the agreement
upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or
note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized.
Sec. 17. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That from and after the said four and twentieth day of June no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandizes, for the price
of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or
in part of payment, or that some note or memorandum in writing of
the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by
such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
CALAMAR & PERILLO, supra note 4, at 774.
It is evident on reading the statute that the provision intends to refer only
to financial agreements, such as dowries. Moreover, the only two cases applying
the statute of frauds to religious upbringing agreements, cited the statute from
the New York Personal Property Law. See Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d
197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Kellner v. Kellner, 90 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. App. Div.
1949).
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Marvin v. Marvin.'2 Were such a couple to disagree on the religious upbringing of their children, an oral agreement, without the
need for a writing, suffices to bind the parties. For, as one commentator has noted in discussing Marvin, "[t]he court in fact gave
greater force to this contract than would be given to an ordinary
antenuptial agreement, since it held this contract could be enforced
even though oral, while an antenuptial contract would be within
the statute of frauds."' 2 9
Thus, when the courts blindly apply 17th century English common law, now largely abandoned in that country, 130 incongruous
consequences result; the courts provide legal protection to an unmarried, cohabiting parent while denying the same protection to a
married parent. This outcome cannot be in the interest of public
policy. However, courts appear reluctant to invoke the statute of
frauds, even when they are unsympathetic to the party seeking to
enforce the antenuptial agreement. The court in Zummo v.
Zummo, 1 3 1 while making passing note of the oral nature of the an-

tenuptial religious upbringing agreement, chose instead to find the
agreement void for indefiniteness.
Even if a court applied the statute of frauds to render an oral
antenuptial agreement unenforceable, a party still retains an avenue for relief by arguing promissory estoppel. Professor Douglas
Whaley provides the following description of the doctrine of promissory estoppel:
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts provides that where
the promisor makes a promise, and can foresee reasonable relian, a on
the promise by the promisee, then to the extent necessary to avoid injustice, courts will enforce the promise, even though there is no traditional consideration given by the promisee to the promisor.
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel has grown by leaps and bounds,
to hold people to promises whenever there is foreseeable detrimental
reliance ....
The doctrine can be used to get around a lack of a technical acceptance, it can be used to get around a lack of consideration... it can be
used to get
around the necessity of a writing in a statute of frauds
1 32
situation."3
128. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 105 (Cal. 1976).
129. CLARK, supra note 124, at 19.
130. 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (1954).
131. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). While 49 states
have statute of frauds provisions (only Louisiana does not), Pennsylvania (one
of five states) specifically requires agreements in consideration of marriage to
be in writing to be enforceable. Bruce Levin and Michael Spak, JudicialEn.
forcement of CohabitationAgreements: A Signal to Purge MarriageFrom the
Statute of Frauds, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 499-500 (1978).
132. DOUGLAS WHALEY, CONTRACTS, SUMS AND SUBSTANCE AUDIO TAPES
(Herbert Legal Services).
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A second avenue is also available to circumvent objections
based on the statute of frauds. While promises in consideration of
marriage fall under the statute of frauds, mutual promises to marry
do not. When one party converts or agrees to raise children in the
other party's faith, this agreement is part and parcel of a mutual
agreement to marry, rather than an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Therefore, even if one party argues the statute of frauds,
the other party maintains arguments to enforce the religious upbringing agreement.
f. Arguments Based on Indefiniteness
In Lynch v. Unlenhopp, 33 an Iowa court voided a religious upbringing agreement on the ground that it was insufficiently definite. The dispute in Lynch was whether a child was to be raised in
the Roman Catholic faith, as provided in the religious upbringing
agreement, or as a Protestant. The Lynch court voided the contract
for indefiniteness, stating "[it is provided [by the agreement] the
said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion. Is this
language so clear, specific and unequivocal that it can be readily understood? ....134 What fast days must be observed, what Lenten
observances followed?"' 35 As suggested in the earlier discussion of
Lynch, in Section I of this article, the Lynch court appears confused. The issue before the court in Lynch was the identity of the
child's religion, not its intensity. Thus, the agreement in Lynch was
"clear, specific and unequivocal" as to what religion the child was to
be raised in.
In Zummo v. Zummo,

36

the Pennsylvania Superior Court

ruled that the trial court erred in enforcing an oral prenuptial
agreement on the religious upbringing of children. In Zummo, the
mother, who was Jewish, and the father, who was Catholic, had
orally agreed prior to their marriage, that they would raise any children in the Jewish faith. At the time the couple divorced, they had
three children, who were eight, four, and three years old. During
the marriage, the children had attended Jewish religious services.
Although the parties shared legal custody, they agreed the mother
would have primary physical custody and the father would have
partial physical custody on alternate weekends. Both parents continued to agree, after the divorce, that the children would be raised
as Jews. The dispute arose, however, when the father took the children to mass and refused to take the eldest child to Bar Mitzvah
133.
134.
135.
136.

Lynch v. Unlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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classes on the Sundays he had custody. The mother objected to
these actions and obtained an order from the lower court stating:
5. Fathershall be obligated duringhis weekend visitatior,. to arrangefor the children'sattendanceat theirSynagogue's Sunday School
.... This provision shall not be construed so as to prevent father from
going on trips or attending special functions with his children ....
6. Fathershall not be permitted to take the children to religious
services contrary to the Jewishfaith, however, this provision shall not
be construed so as to prevent father from taking the children to weddings, funerals, or family gatherings and shall not be construed so as to
prevent father from arranging for the presence of the children
[at]
37
events involving family traditions at Christmas and Easter.'
The father appealed the order to the superior court arguing
that the order violated his constitutional rights and those of his children. The superior court, in a two-to-one decision, agreed with the
father. As a result, the court vacated the restrictions. They did,
however, affirm the part of the order directing the father to take
his children to the Jewish Sunday School. The superior court concluded that, "the trial court erred in giving the oral pre-nuptial
agreement much significance." In this context, the agreement was
entitled to no significance. The decision to grant it such weight was
constitutionally impermissible and an abuse of discretion." 13s
There are several difficulties with the superior court's reasoning. First, the superior court was confused with respect to the issue
in the case. The mother only asked the court to recognize the parties' agreement to raise a child in a specific faith, and to consider
enforcing that agreement. Thus, the court's assertion that, "as
courts may not divine truth or falsity in matters of religious doctrine, custom, or belief, courts may not give weight or consideration
to such factors in resolving legal disputes in civil courts"1 39 was irrelevant to the court's determination. The court was not asked to
compare the truth or falsity of any faith, nor to compare the validity
and value of one faith over another. The court's task was merely to
assess issues of contract law, not religious doctrine.
Second, the superior court was confused about the concept of
indefiniteness. The court characterized the couple's religious upbringing agreement as "vague," giving weight to the father's claim
that though he understood that their agreement called for their
children to "receive [a] formal Jewish education, he did not understand it to preclude him from exposing the children to Catholic
mass .... " The mother, on the other hand envisioned an "exclusive Jewish... indoctrination.' 40 It is unclear how an agreement
137. Id. at 1142.
138. Id. at 1148.
139. Id. at 1135.

140. Id. at 1145.
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to raise children as Jewish could be considered so vague as to include a Catholic mass. The superior court noted that under the
lower court's order, the father was prohibited from taking his children to religious services contrary to the Jewish faith. The superior
court then asked "[w]hat constitutes a 'religious service?' Which
are 'contrary' to the Jewish faith? What for that matter is the 'Jewish' faith? Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist,
Messianic... might differ widely on this point."'141
This statement is astonishing. "Messianic Jews" are people of
Jewish descent who have accepted Jesus as Lord. These people are
unequivocally of the Christian faith. If the superior court could not
distinguish between ethnic background and faith, it is not surprising that it would find an agreement to raise children as Jewish unenforceable due to "indefiniteness."
Third, the superior court noted that "[t]he indefiniteness of the
instant oral agreement precludes enforcement on ordinary contract
principles as it demonstrates no meeting of minds on the critical
issues of the exclusivity and intensity of the Jewish education envisioned by the parties ... ."142 This argument demonstrates a misunderstanding of the differences between Judaism and Catholicism.
The Jewish and Catholic faiths, while related and held in mutual
respect, are also mutually exclusive. A Jew's rejection of the divinity of Jesus effectively excludes him from the Catholic faith. Conversely, the beliefs of a Catholic regarding Jesus preclude that
person from being of the Jewish faith. Judaism and Catholicism
are exclusive from each other not only in faith, but also in practice.
Jews do not make a regular habit of going to mass. Catholics tend
not to enroll their children in Jewish parochial schools. A dispassionate observer, on learning that children were to be raised as
Jews, would hardly be unwarranted in assuming these children
would not be attending mass on a regular basis. However, because
the Zummo religious upbringing agreement did not specifically
state that the children would not be raised in or exposed to the
Catholic faith as well as the Jewish faith, the superior court deemed
the oral contract indefinite. If there had been such an understanding, would the court have enforced the agreement?
Finally, the superior court mistook religious intensity as a central issue in the dispute. The court argued that there was "no meeting of minds on the.., intensity of the Jewish education envisioned
by the parties"'143 and contended that this made for "indefiniteness." However, the sole "intensity" issue before the court was the
mother's plea that the child continue with his Bar Mitzvah lessons.
141. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146.
142. Id. at 1145.

143. Id.
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Since a dispassionate observer would reasonably expect a boy being
raised in the Jewish faith to have Bar Mitzvah lessons, it is unclear
why the superior court found "intensity" to be a "critical issue" of
such "indefiniteness" as to "preclude ordinary contract principles."
In addition to the arguments discussed above, the superior
court in Zummo further posited that all religious upbringing agreements "must remain as legally unenforceable in civil courts as the
wedding vows the parties even more solemnly exchanged... [as] ...
(wedding vows express a mere future expectation)." 144 This too is a
poor argument. If, by the term "wedding vows" the court is referring to the rhetorical language, "love, honor and obey," it should be
noted that commitments to raise children in a specific religion are
not made in exchange for such statements. On the contrary, the
religious upbringing commitment is given in exchange for the actual marital state. If, on the other hand, the court used the term
"wedding vows" to refer to the actual marital state, that state is
hardly a "mere expectation" without obligations. On the contrary,
the marital state is a contract which imposes significant obligations.
As noted, and demonstrated above, courts enforce religious upbringing agreements as often as not.145 Considering the hostile
"separation of church and state" atmosphere in which courts rendered these decisions, these results can be interpreted as a testament to the potency of the argument for enforcement. Moreover,
contrary to conventional wisdom that courts have never enforced
antenuptial religious upbringing agreements over the objections of
one of the parents, there are, in fact, three such decisions. 146 Nonetheless, courts are more likely to enforce religious upbringing
agreements which are part of an agreement in contemplation of divorce, than they are to enforce an antenuptial religious upbringing
agreement. Yet, as the court stated in Spring v. Glawon,147 there is
"little substantive difference between the [two]."'148
144. Id. at 1147.
145. A large number of these decisions came down in the New York courts.

New York enforced these agreements in nine cases, and did not enforce them in
seven. In jurisdictions outside New York, courts enforced these agreements in
six cases and declined to enforce them in nine.

New York's high number of cases reflects perhaps the greater religious

diversity in that state, and in particular, its large Jewish population. Conflicts
between a Christian and a Jewish parent on the religious upbringing of their

children are likely to be of greater intensity than disputes between two parents
of differing Christian denominations. Therefore, these conflicts are more likely
to be brought before the courts.
146. Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 183 N.E. 429 (N.Y. 1932); Shearer v. Shearer,
73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1942).
147. Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
148. Id. at 142.
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The Best Interests of the Child as Applied to Religious
UpbringingDisputes

Clearly, there is an inherent tension between the best interests
of the children on the one hand, and the First Amendment rights of
one of the parents on the other. The courts take one of two approaches in weighing the significance of these two interests. Some
courts given primacy to the interests of the children, holding that a
"reasonablelikelihood of future harm" will trigger a decree. Other
courts, however, give primacy to the rights of the parent, requiring
a "clear, convincing, demonstration of present harm" before they
will enforce a religious upbringing agreement. As will be shown
below, the choice a court makes between these two standards likely
determines their decisions.
1.

Cases Decided on a "ReasonableLikelihood" Standard

In every case in which a court adopted the "reasonable likelihood of future harm" threshold, the court imposed some sort of restriction on religious upbringing by one of the parents. In Miller v.
Hedrick,149 the California Appellate Court upheld a lower court's
order restraining a noncustodial divorced father from exposing his
child to the father's religion, unless he obtained the custodial
mother's approval. In Miller, the couple was married in 1951 and
divorced in 1953. The court heard this religious upbringing dispute
in 1958, when the child was five and a half years old. The father
was a Jehovah's Witness, the mother a Catholic. The mother curtailed the father's weekend visitation when she discovered that he
was taking their son to religious meetings and having him sell Jehovah's Witness literature door to door. The mother, who was raising
her child in the Catholic faith, believed it would be "antagonistic to
have a child taught a belief contrary to those he is regularly
taught."150 The trial court noted that "as between parents the parent having legal custody was entitled to determine the child's religion." 151 Basing its decision on the welfare of the child, the trial
court restrained the father from involving his child in any religious
activities unless the child's mother permitted those activities.
The father appealed the restraining order, claiming that "the
court erred in holding that as between parents the parent having
legal custody is entitled to determine the child's religious training;
that the court abused its discretion in reducing plaintiff's visitation
149. Miller v. Hedrick, 322 P.2d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
150. Id. at 232.
151. Id. (citing BARBARA N. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAw 954
(1953); Burge v. San Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953); Lerner v. Superior Ct
of San Mateo County, 242 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1952)).
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rights because of this plaintiff's religious opinion."' 1 2 The father
cited opinions which held, in effect, that the court has no authority
over the child's religious training and discipline and in a custody
dispute, religious views afford no ground for depriving a parent of
custody, if the parent is otherwise qualified. The appellate court,
however, upheld the restraining order. Quoting Lerner v. Superior
Court,153 the appellate court stated that "[t]he essence of custody is
the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions re154
garding his care and control, education, health, and religion."
The appellate court also emphasized that the welfare of the child is
the paramount consideration, observing that under the doctrine of
parens patriae,the court "has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's wel' 15
fare and which may be detrimental to the mind of the child."'
Similarly, in Morris v. Morris,58 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the best interests of the child outweighed the
First Amendment rights of the noncustodial parent. John and Jean
Morris were married in a Roman Catholic ceremony in 1974,
although the husband was not a Catholic. Their child, Lisa, was
born eight months later. Both husband and wife agreed to raise any
children from their marriage as Roman Catholics. However, tl..
husband subsequently became a Jehovah's Witness. In 1977, when
the couple divorced, the court awarded the mother custody with visitation rights for the father. The relationship was amicable until
the following year, when the mother learned that the father was
taking Lisa on door to door solicitations for the Jehovah's Witnesses
as well as to Sunday meetings. Although the mother objected, the
father continued these activities with the child. Finally, the mother
refused the father all visitation privileges.
The father then brought a habeas corpus action. The court
granted him visitation rights every other weekend, but prohibited
him from engaging in door to door religious solicitations with his
daughter. The father appealed, claiming the order infringed upon
his right to the free exercise of religion, and his right to privacy.
However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld the order of
the lower court. The superior court's comments bear repeating152. Miller, 322 P.2d at 233 (citing Cory v. Cory, 161 P.2d 385 (Cal. Ct. App.
1945); Denton v. James, 193 P. 307 (Kan. 1920); Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660
(N.Y. 1936); Stone v. Stone, 133 P.2d 526 (Wash. 1943)).
153. Lerner, 242 P.2d 321.
154. Miller, 322 P.2d at 233.
155. Id. at 233 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Fine v.
Denny, 244 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Ludlow v. Ludlow, 201 P.2d 579 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1949); Wilson v. Wilson, 137 P.2d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)).
156. Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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It would be an egregious error by our courts in a custody dispute
to scrutinize the ability of the parents to foster the child's emotional development, their capacity to provide adequate shelter
and sustenance, and their relative
income, yet not review their
57
respective religious beliefs.'
[w]ithin the best interests concept [in a child custody dispute] is
the stability and consistency of the child's spiritual inculcation.15 8
The paramount consideration is the best interests and welfare of
the child ....
(citations omitted). Although best interests is necessarily a nebular term, rendering itself amenable to neither simple definition nor application, it embraces the
child's physical,
59
intellectual, moral and spiritual well being'1
[i]t is legitimate for a court [in a child custody dispute]
to examine
60
the impact of the parents' beliefs on the child.'
[w]hile the adoption of a belief is absolutely protected,
there ex61
ists only a qualified right to act on that belief.'
[w]hile religious beliefs must not constitute the sole determinant
in a child custody award,
the court may consider those beliefs in
62
rendering a decree.'
[Considerations given to religious beliefs in custody matters] apply with equal force to matters involving visitation, or partial
1 63
custody.
[A court considering religious beliefs in rendering a challenged
custody award] neither intend to, nor are capable of, rendering a
value judgment on the intrinsic truth of the varied religious beliefs, but confine [its] investigation solely to any detrimental effect their practice [of those beliefs] may have on the development
of the child. 64
[w]e cannot accept an argument that the absence of present harm
constricts the court's power to act. Were this the case, we would
have to allow psychological harm to Lisa to progress to a mentally
crippling point before action could be taken. With that damage a
fait accompli, however, any remedial action would be marginally
effective. For our purposes it may be unfortunate, but the state of
the art in psychiatry is such that absolute certainty is not possible

[I]nconsistent teachings would probably result in some mental disorientation to Lisa. We believe that this is sufficient to override any right
appellant may have in draping the whole of his religious beliefs upon
165
the child.
In several recent decisions, courts have ruled that limiting religious upbringing to instruction in a single religion serves the best
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 142.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Morris, 412 A.2d at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
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interests of the child. In Andros v. Andros,166 the Court of Appeals
of Minnesota modified a joint arrangement and granted sole custody to the mother in order to resolve a dispute over the religious
upbringing of the children. The Andros court also restricted the
father's visitation rights to prevent him from taking the children to
his church. When the parties were divorced in 1983, the court
granted physical custody of the two children to the mother and
granted joint legal custody and reasonable, liberal visitation to the
father. Both parties remarried. At the time of the father's remarriage, he sought to involve the children in his activities with the
Assemblies of God which led to disputes with the mother, a Lutheran. Some of their arguments took place in the presence of the
children. The mother feared that her ex-husband was attempting
to convert the children to his faith and to his "very fundamental
beliefs. He told the children that Halloween costumes were symbols of the devil... and informed the children that there was no
Santa Claus or Easter Bunny."' 67 The mother sought sole custody
and a court order to restrict the father from involving the children
in his religious activities. In his defense, the father argued that he
supported the children's attendance at the mother's Lutheran
church but also claimed that the children enjoyed their activities at
his church. The wife countered that when the children returned
home from visits to the father's church, they were "extremely upset
and [in an] emotional state indicating that I was going to hell because I did not go to the correct church."'16 The mother had the
children examined by a psychologist, who found that "the children
are equally fond of both parents, and have suffered no permanent
damage as a result of the divorce."'169 However, the psychologist
further testified that in his opinion "attendance at two churches
with beliefs and practices as divergent as in this case may endanger
the children's emotional health."'170 The psychologist added that
"because the children are so closely bonded with both parents, they
feel a need to try to please both. However, the children know that
to please one parent necessarily involves displeasing the other."' 1' 1
The trial court recognized a threat to the children's emotional
well being finding:
7. That, as this conflict is made evident to the children through the
parties, either by direct conversation or by the parties through the
practice of their religion, it creates a conflict in the children because of their love for each parent, their desire to please each par166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.

171. Andros, 396 N.W.2d at 920.
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ent, and that, that conflict at this age has not caused any emotional
damage but is172very likely to impair the emotional development of
the children.
That there is nothing in the religious practices of either party
which, if practiced singly, would be detrimental to173the development of the children's emotional health or welfare.
That there has been no impairment of emotional health up to this
point, because the children have been affected only by the exteriors of the conflict because of their age and ability to perceive the
differences in beliefs and practices, but that in the immediate future the differences, other than exterior only, will, in all likelihood, endanger their emotional development. 174

In his appeal, the father conceded that his visitation remained liberal, but claimed that "restricting visitation so that he cannot take
the children to his church unduly restricts his relationship with
them and abridges his freedom of religion." 175 The court of appeals
did not agree, "[a]ppellant's [father's] freedom to exercise his religious beliefs remains exactly the same as before. The court's order
properly gives respondent, not appellant, exclusive control of the
children's religious training. It is settled law in Minnesota that the
custodial parent of minor children has control of the children's religious upbringing."' 176 The court of appeals also rejected the father's
contention that the court improperly considered the relative merits
of the two religions:
The court inquired into the parties' religious beliefs for the purpose of
determining whether the conflict over the parties' religions was serious enough to affect the custody issue. Although the court found that
the conflict was serious enough to terminate joint legal custody, the
177
court specifically remained neutral on the merits of either religion.
Finally, the court of appeals refused to apply the standard of
"compelling state interest"178 to the restriction placed on the father's visitation:
The court's modification of visitation affects neither applicant's [father's] religious beliefs, nor his right to practice his religion. The
court's ruling simply repeats the law, a legal custodian has the right to
determine the minor children's religious training.
We hold that the court's decision does not affect appellant's constitutional right to freedom of religion. Although appellant's wish to involve the children in his religious activities is now subject to
respondent's consent while they are minors, appellant is, and always
179
has been, free to practice his religious beliefs as he sees fit.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 923.
Andros, 396 N.W.2d at 923-24 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518-003 (1984)).
Id. at 924.

178. Id.

179. Id.
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In Short v. Short,1 8 0 a custody dispute involving a mother who
was a Jehovah's Witness, the Colorado Supreme Court overturned a
lower court ruling that the mother's religious beliefs and practices
were inadmissible. The supreme court found the lower court's use
of the standard of "substantial probability that the religious belief
or practice will result in actual harm or endangerment to the child's
welfare" to be "unduly restrictive."''1
Instead, the supreme court
found that the mother's religious beliefs and practices need only be
"reasonably likely to cause present or future harm to the physical
or mental development of the child," to be admissible in a custody
1 82
determination.
In LeDoux v. LeDoux, 8 3s the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld
a trial court order barring a noncustodial Jehovah's Witness father
from exposing his children to any beliefs or practices inconsistent
with the religious teachings of the Catholic faith, the religion in
which the mother was raising the children. The trial court found
that exposing the children to more than one faith would be detrimental. The supreme court noted that, "[p]rohibiting a court from
considering religious factors under any circumstances would blind
courts to important elements bearing on the best interests of the
child."'' 8 4 The court also noted that, "the right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose ... the child to . .. ill
85
health."
In two recent cases, courts have gone even further, ordering
the noncustodial parent to cooperate with the custodial parent in
the latter's religious upbringing of their children. In Overman v.
Overman,8 6 the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the custodial
parent, "may determine the child's upbringing, including his education, health care, and religious training," to the extent that the noncustodial parent can be required to transport the child to catechism
classes on his visitation time, against the noncustodial parent's
wishes.' 8 7 The Indiana Court of Appeals based its decision on an
Indiana statute that permitted the custodial parent to "determine
the child's upbringing, including his education, health care, and religious training ... ."188 Similarly, in In re Tiscos,1 89 the court or180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Short v. Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1985).
Id. at 1313.
Id.
LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990).
Id. at 5 (quoting Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Alaska 1979)).
Id. at 5 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)).
Overman v. Overman, 497 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 619 (citing the IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(b) (Burn's Supp.

1987)).
189. In re Tiscos, 514 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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dered a noncustodial Baptist father either to take his child to
Roman Catholic church services during his Sunday morning visitation periods or to leave the child with the custodial mother. In
these cases, the courts, after applying a reasonable likelihood standard, limited one parent's actions affecting the religious upbringing
of his or her child.
2. Cases Decided on a 'Clear Demonstration"Standard

In contrast to giving primacy to the child's interests, some
courts give primacy to the parents rights and will not restrict their
actions unless the other parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer present harm. In Munoz v.
Munoz,19° the Supreme Court of Washington required "a clear and
affirmative showing that conflicting religious beliefs affect the general welfare of the child" before it would interfere with a child's
religious upbringing. 191 The Munoz trial court had enjoined a Catholic father from exposing his children to his faith. The children
were in the custody of their mother, a Mormon who had converted
to the Catholic faith prior to the marriage but subsequently returned to the Mormon faith. The trial court held that the custodial
parent should determine the children's religion. The trial court
also believed that exposing the children to conflicting beliefs would
be detrimental. The Supreme Court of Washington, applying a
"clear demonstration" standard, reversed the injunction.
In Murga v. Peterson,192 the California Court of Appeals refused to enjoin a noncustodial father from discussing his religion
with his child and from involving his child in his religious activities,
absent a showing that the children would be harmed by such discussions or activities. At the time the parties dissolved the marriage,
the court awarded the mother custody of the couple's three year old
son. In 1978, the father asked the court to modify his visitation
rights because he was moving to Florida to enroll in a Bible institute. In addition to opposing any change in the father's visitation
rights, the mother asked the court to restrain the father from "(1)
requiring the child to engage in any religious activities except as
approved by the mother; (2) sermonizing, evangelizing, instructing,
discoursing with, and/or attempting to indoctrinate the child on any
religious subject without her prior approval ....' 193 The trial court

granted the visitation modifications and allowed the father to phone
the child once a week, "on condition that he refrain from discussing
190. Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971).
191. Id. at 1135.
192. Murga v. Peterson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

193. Id. at 501.
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any religious or biblical activities."'194 The court imposed no further
religious restrictions on the father.
The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant the restraining order she had requested. In support of her contention, the mother told the court
that:
When the child is visiting with his father, he is required to spend
15 or 20 minutes a day... reading and discussing the Bible, praying and
singing. On Sundays, he is taken to church and Sunday School. He
once told his mother that his father had taken him on a door-to-door
crusade to save people; the father denied that any such outing ever
occurred. The mother asserts that as a result of the father's imposition
of his religious attitudes and practices, the child hates religion and refuses to go to church with her. She has requested the father not to
discuss religion with the child, but the father has refused to accede to
her requests. 195
The mother contended "that, as the custodial parent, she ha[d] an
absolute right to direct the child's religious upbringing; that the father's imposition of his religious beliefs and practices has so alienated the child that the mother is unable to exercise this custodial
right."'196 The appellate court found no California decision where,
absent evidence of harm to the child, a court enjoined a noncustodial parent from discussing or involving the child in his or her
religion. The court also noted decisions from other jurisdictions
favoring the noncustodial parent on this issue.197 On the basis of
these cases, the court refused to enjoin the noncustodial parent, citing "the protected nature of religious activities and expressions of
belief" and "the proscription against preferring one religion over
another."'198 The appellate court held that "custody decisions will
not be governed by the religious tenets or practices of parents absent a clear showing that the parent's religious practices would be
harmful to the child."'19 9 The court claimed its decision was "consistent with the only case we have discovered dealing with visitation
2 °°
rights and religious beliefs and practices, Miller v. Hedrick."
The opinion in Murga is most curious. The appellate court
writes that it can find no California decision in which, absent evidence of harm to the child, a court enjoined a noncustodial parent
194. Id.
195. Id. at 502.
196. Id. at 504.
197. See, e.g., Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971) (noncustodial father may take child to Catholic services unless evidence shows detrimental to

child).
198. Murga v. Peterson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
199. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Urband, 68 Cal. App. 3d 796,797-98 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977); Cory v. Cory, 161 P.2d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945)).
200. Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 505 (citing Miller v. Hedrick, 322 P.2d 231
(Cal. Ct. App. 1958)).
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from discussing or involving the child in the noncustodial parent's
religion. In point of fact, however, there is such a decision, Miller v.
Hedrick.20 1 Even more disturbing, the appellate court claims that
its decision is "consistent with the only case we have discovered
dealing with visitation rights and religious beliefs and practices,
Miller v. Hedrick."20 2 First, the appellate court misplaces Miller,
then it inexplicably rewrites it. The Murga court's decision and reasoning are, in fact, quite the opposite of the Miller court's decision
and reasoning. In Miller,the court did not require a "clear showing
of harm to the child" before it would intervene for the child's protection. To read such a requirement into Miller is to turn that decision on its head.
In Felton v. Felton,20 3 the Massachusetts Supreme Court required a detailed demonstration of harm to the child to justify limiting a parent's religious instruction of the child. In Felton, the
supreme court ruled that a trial court incorrectly curtailed the noncustodial father, a Jehovah's Witness, from instructing his children
in his religious beliefs. The mother, a Congregationalist, claimed
that the father was confusing and disorienting the children and
alienating them from her. The trial court agreed, finding a "deleterious effect" on the children and an "undermining" of the custodial
relationship with the mother. The court, in effect, forbade visitation unless the father ceased the instruction.
The supreme court, however, remanded the case for reconsideration, noting a lack of foundation for the lower court's findings
after determining the mother's testimony was insufficient evidence.
As the supreme court wrote:
The parents together have freedom of religious expression and practice
which enters into their liberty to manage the familial relationships.
(citations omitted). But the "best interests" of the child are to be promoted, and when the parents are at odds, the attainment of that purpose may involve some limitation of the liberties of one or other of the
parents. (citations omitted). However, harm to the child from conflicting religious instructions or practices, which would justify such a limitation, should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be
demonstrated in detail. (citations omitted).
If the dominating goal of the enterprise is to serve a child's best
interests.. . , then it might be thought to follow that a policy of stability or repose should be adopted by which the child would be exposed to
but one religion (presumably that of the custodial parent) at whatever
cost to the "liberties" of the other parent. (citations omitted). The
law, however, tolerates and even encourages up to a point the child's
exposure to the religious influences of both parents although they are
divided in their faiths. This, we think, is because the law sees a value
201. Miller, 322 P.2d at 231.
202. Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 505.
203. Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981).
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in "frequent and continuing contact" of the child with both its parents,
(citation omitted) and thus contact with the parents' separate religious
preferences. (citation omitted). There may also be a value in letting
the child see, even at an early age, the religious models betw en which
it is likely to be led to choose later in life. And it is suggested, sometimes, that 20
a diversity
of religious experience is itself a sound stimulant
4
for a child.
Because the above passage from Felton became authority, quoted in
full in Mentry v. Mentry20 5 and quoted in part in Khalsa v.
Khalsa,2° 6 it warrants closer scrutiny. The supreme court wrote in
Felton "harm... from conflicting religious instructions ... [to] justify... a limitation, should not be simply assumed or surmised; it
must be demonstrated in detail." 20 7 In taking this approach, the
court assumes that any harm from conflicting religious "instruction" (indoctrination would be a more appropriate word) would
present itself in a readily "demonstrable" fashion and in a close
temporal relationship to that conflicting "instruction." It is well established, however, that conflicts within children resulting from
the divorce of their parents may not manifest themselves until
years later.208 Furthermore, religion is more than just faith. For
many people, religion defines their identity. Consequently, confusion over religion at age seven can lead to confusion over identity at
age twelve. There is no basis for the supreme court's assumption in
Felton that such harm will be readily demonstrable and immediate.
The supreme court in Felton further writes, "[tihe law... tolerates and even encourages up to a point the child's exposure to the
religious influences of both parents although they are divided in
their faiths. '20 9 However, the noncustodial parent's intent in Felton (and Mentry and Khalsa) was not merely to expose his children
to his religion. His intent was to indoctrinate the children into his
religion. The supreme court's statement should, therefore, be rewritten, as follows: "The law.., tolerates, and even encourages, up
to a point, the child's indoctrination into the religions of both parents, although they are divided in their faiths." In Felton, the
supreme court defines "up to a point" as 'harm...
demonstrated in
detail."2 10 Therefore, rewriting the sentence, but remaining faithful to the court's definitions, is "the law, however, tolerates and
even encourages the child's indoctrination into the religions of both
204. Id. at 607-08.
205. Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
206. Khalsa v. Khalsa, 751 P.2d 715, 720 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
207. Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 607.
208. Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a
Ten-Year Follow-Up of Young Children, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 444 (Jul.
1984).
209. Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 607.
210. Id.
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parents, although they are divided in their faiths, up to harm
demonstrated in detail." Moreover, "divided" is not descriptive of
the parents' religious views in Felton. "In conflict" is a more accurate characterization. Nor is the faith of the p-.rents the issue in
Felton; the issue is the religious indoctrination of the child. The
supreme court's sentence thus becomes, "the law, however, tolerates and even encourages the child's indoctrination into conflicting
religions, up to harm demonstrated in detail." The law, of course,
says no such thing. Finally, the supreme court also erred when it
wrote, "[a]nd it is suggested, sometimes, that a diversity of religious
experience is itself a sound stimulant for a child,' 211 citing Smith v.
Smith.21 2 The court in Smith made no such statement or
suggestion.
In Mentry v. Mentry, 213 the California Court of Appeals, in a
two-to-one decision, relied primarily on Felton to overturn a lower
court restraining order that prohibited a noncustodial father from
involving his children in his religion during his visitation periods.
Mentry involved a couple who were members of the Mormon
Church. When they dissolved their marriage in 1979, the wife left
the Mormon religion, and joined another church. At the time of the
dissolution, their children were seven and six years old. The court
granted the father visitation rights. In 1980, the mother sought an
order restraining the father from involving the children in any religious activities without the mother's approval. The trial court
stated that the mother's request would be governed by the rule
presented in Murga, "a court will not enjoin the noncustodial parent from discussing religion with the child or involving the child in
his or her religious activities in the absence of a showing that the
child will be thereby damaged." 2 14 At the hearing, the court conciliator testified that he believed that involving the children in two
religions would confuse them, thus the father's religious activities
with the children would be harmful. The trial court agreed, and
issued an order restraining the father from involving his children in
his religious activities during his visitation.
In reviewing the trial testimony, the appellate court noted that
the conciliator never actually interviewed the children. In the appellate court's opinion, the conciliator's opinion was essentially conjectural. The appellate court reversed the trial court relying
primarily on Felton.215 The appellate court also stated that Murga
"is the only California decision that defines a standard for deter211. Id. at 608.
212. Smith v. Smith, 367 P.2d 230 (Ariz. 1961).
213. Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).

214. Id. at 262 (quoting Murga v. Peterson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 505 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (Miller, J., dissenting)).

215. Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981).
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mining whether a custodial parent may enjoin the noncustodial parent from discussing religious subjects with the child or from
involving the child in the noncustodial parent's religious
216
activities."
Unlike the court in Murga, which reinvented Miller,the appellate court in Mentry sidestepped Miller, stating that while, "Miller
(citation omitted) addresses the question whether to restrict visitation rights due to religious differences between the parents, but
rather than defining any criteria for making such a determination
simply defers to the discretion of the trial court."2 17 A reading of
Miller, however, clearly reveals that the Miller court offers a criterion for such a determination. Specifically, Miller permits the court
to restrict visitation rights in any conflict, "affecting the child's wel' 218
fare and which may be detrimental to the mind of the child.
Obviously, the court in Mentry did not agree with the Miller standard, but to skirt precedent in this fashion is disingenuous.
Mentry noted that:
Murga,Felton and most of the cases they rely upon reflect a salutary
judicial disinclination to interfere with family privacy without the evidentiary establishment of compelling need. (citation omitted) This attitude. ...is predicated... on the recognition that a ".... court cannot
regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home ....The vast
majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children must be left
to the conscience, patience, and self restraint of the father and mother.
No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to219
tell parents how
to bring up their children." (citing Sisson v. Sisson).
Raising the issue of family privacy in the context of religious
upbringing disputes is questionable. The family at issue is now a
former family. There is now a new family, that of the custodial parent and the children. Quite central to the privacy of the new family
is the right to develop and follow religious beliefs and precepts,
without court supported intrusions that will disrupt, and possibly
shred, the family's religious identity and cohesion. The issue of
family privacy has never been raised in these disputes. The issues
are first, the best interests of the children balanced against one parent's claim of constitutional rights and, second, the enforceability of
religious upbringing commitments. The cited statement from Sisson 220 also implies that a religious upbringing dispute does not present an issue of compelling need. However, for the parents and
children involved, religious upbringing is among the most critical of
216. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. at 264.
217. Id. at 264 n.2.
218. Miller v. Hedrick, 322 P.2d 231, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
219. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 266-67 (citing Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660,
661 (N.Y. 1936)).
220. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1936).
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issues. Moreover, Sisson simply does not apply to religious upbringing disputes, particularly in the context of custody battles and divorce, which are not typically characterized by "patience and self
restraint." Sisson was merely a dispute between a wealthy husband
and wife as to whether their daughter should go to boarding school
in Switzerland. Sisson presented no issue of divorce or custody.
Sisson presented no issue of religion. By comparison, the issues in
Sisson were inconsequential to the issues presented in religious upbringing disputes. Finding a common principle in Sisson and religious upbringing disputes is, therefore, quite remarkable.
As noted above, the Court of Appeals in Mentry was split twoto-one. The dissenting judge found that:
the evidence presented at the trial below and my analysis of California
and sister-state case law compel an opposite conclusion to that reached
by my colleagues ....
The majority opinion bases its decision on the single determination that the evidence is manifestly insufficient to justify the restraining order. However, it is settled that in matters relating to child
custody and visitation rights the trial court is given broad discretion
....In my view the court below not only did not abuse its discretion
but correctly decided how the "best interests" of the children were to
be promoted.
Although not explicitly stated, the majority opinion impliedly
holds that a showing of actual harm to the children must be made
before infringing upon the non-custodial parent's constitutional liberties. This is not the law. Murga held that a non-custodial parent will
not be enjoined from exposing the child to his or her religious activities
"in the absence of a showing that the child will be thereby harmed."
(citation omitted). The holding employs the future tense which necessarily is somewhat speculative. This policy of permitting the courts to
intervene prior to a child suffering actual injury is sound; it would be
meaningless to state that the court must act in the best interests of the
child then restrain
the court from acting until the child is demonstra221
bly harmed.
Until Murga in 1977, California case law allowed courts to take
into account the likely harmful effects of religious discord on a
child. Since 1977, the dissent in Mentry notwithstanding, California
law apparently demands, for all practical purposes, the demonstration of an actual harmful effect.
In Hadeen v. Hadeen, 222 the Washington Court of Appeals observed that it was "improvident" for a court to await actual harm to
a child before considering the religious decisions and acts of parents. Nonetheless, the court of appeals remanded a custody dispute
for reconsideration on the ground that the trial court's award of
custody to the father, based on the mother's involvement with a
221. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 270 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
222. Hadeen v. Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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radical fundamentalist sect, might have violated the mother's constitutional rights.223 The mother in Hadeen belonged to a sect that
encouraged, as a form of discipline, "[e]nforced isolation, fasting,
and zealous beatings," and also encouraged "vile language toward,
lying to, and shunning of non-believers and non-members of the
sect. '2 24 The trial court found that the denomination the mother
belonged to "requires complete submission and fidelity to the exclusion of other reasonable relationships that usually exists." 22 The
trial court placed the minor children in the custody of the father,
finding that awarding custody to the mother would cut the father
off from involvement with the children. In remanding the case, the
court of appeals stated:
The trial court's finding that Mrs. Hadeen is in complete submission to
the church to the exclusion of other "reasonable" relationships is a
subjective conclusion which should have played no part in the trial
court's decision unless Mrs. Hadeen's submission posed a substantial
threat of endangering the children's mental or physical welfare. There
was no [such] evidence .... 26
In Bentley v. Bentleym the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld a lower court order prohibiting a noncustodial
Jehovah's Witness father from instructing his children in his religion. The mother was raising the children in the Catholic faith.
The lower court based its order on a finding that the children were
"emotionally strained and torn" because of the parents' conflicting
religious beliefs. The supreme court held that the lower court acted
within its discretionary power in determining "that the best interests of these children dictates that they be reared in only one religion."' 8 Unfortunately, the Bentley court did not disclose the
evidence or testimony on which the court based its finding that the
children were "emotionally strained and torn." Bentley is, therefore, not helpful in defining the "clear demonstration of harm"
standard.
By contrast, in Funk v. Ossman,22 the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on a detailed demonstration of actual harm suffered by
a child subjected to indoctrination in conflicting religions. The
court of appeals in Funk affirmed a trial court order permitting a
noncustodial Jewish father to take his child to synagogue, but enjoining the father from subjecting the child to religious instruction
223.
224.
1980).
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Hadeen v. Hadeen, 7 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 2051, 2053 (Wash Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
Id. at 560.
Funk v. Ossman, 724 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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in Judaism. The trial court found that the child, whose mother was
raising him as a Lutheran, was suffering from anxiety and psychological injury as a result of the conflicts between the two religions.
The parties in Funk were married in a Jewish ceremony in 1973,
following the wife's conversion to Judaism. When they were divorced in 1978, they had a fifteen month old son. The court
awarded custody to the mother and gave the father reasonable visitation rights. After the divorce, the mother converted to the Lutheran faith, became a lay minister, and began raising their child as
a Lutheran. In 1983, the father sought a court order that their son
be raised exclusively in the Jewish faith. The hearing was held in
1984, and included the testimony of three psychologists. The trial
court found that:
[A]ll three psychologists believed that a child should not be simultaneously raised in, and receive religious training in both religions and that
training in both religions would not be in the best interests of the child.
The court further found from the testimony of the psychologists that it
would be very hard on the child and against the best interest of the
child if he were living with the custodial parent, a practicing Christian,
but was receiving formal religious education in Judaism.230
The trial court denied the father's petition and ruled that the
mother continued to hold the right to direct and control the religious upbringing of the child.
Approximately half a year later, the mother filed a petition alleging that the father was in contempt of court because he enrolled
the child in a Jewish Sunday School. The trial court found that,
"the teachings and doctrines of Christianity and Judaism are mutually exclusive." 23 ' The court enjoined the father from taking the
eight year old child for formal training or indoctrination in the Jewish faith but permitted the father to involve the child in his faith
through the celebration of holidays and visits to the synagogue, exposure which the mother had not objected to. The father appealed,
claiming the injunction was improper because "no immediate harm
2 32
to the child was shown."
The court of appeals stated:
When it is made to appear that a conflict between divorced parents
as to religious instruction is affecting the welfare of their children, a
court should always act in accordance with what is best for the happiness and welfare of the child. In legal contemplation, the court recognizes no difference in objectives between religious or other conflicts
.... (citations omitted)
When do the courts interfere? We adopt the rule set forth in Munoz:
230. Id. at 1249.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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the courts... should not... restrain any person having custody or
visitation rights from taking the children to a particular church,
except where there is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs affect the general welfare of the child. (citation omitted).
The facts here justify the court's interference. Rabbi Weizenbaum in
whose Sunday school Hal [the child] was enrolled testified:
"[O]ne doesn't raise a child to be both a Christian and a Jew at the
same time. I don't think this is a healthy approach to raising a
child. I would tell anybody that, because the reasoning is the same
for anybody. I would never recommend that approach."
"I don't think that it is a good policy to raise a child to be one
thing, and to send him to a school which teaches him to be something else. I think that is to create conflict, which is not healthy
for the child.... "
Dr. Burkholder, a child psychologist who had been counseling Hal,
testified that because of the differences in religions it would be confusing for any child to try to consolidate in his mind two different concepts and would cause long-term confusion and a decision-making
problem. She also testified that Hal is having an anxiety problem
which he tries very hard not to show but that the anxiety has manifested itself in a psychosomatic problem, soiling his pants (encopresis).
This problem and his tension and anxiety ceased when....Hal ceased
going to the Jewish Sunday school. As a result of being put in the middle of the relationship between his parents, his anxiety is manifested
by the encopresis. He feels that he is a mediator and must 3please both
parents, including pleasing them over the religious issue.P
Based on the above reasoning and evidence, the court of appeals upheld the trial court order. Thus, in Funk the child's encopresis, apparently due to anxiety over going to Hebrew school,
constituted a "clear affirmative" showing of harm. Funk is the only
published case in which a party provided such evidence to meet the
"clear and demonstration of harm" standard set forth in Murga and
Felton. The court in Bentley made a similar finding of harm, but
failed to disclose the evidence on which its finding was based.
In Zummo v. Zummo, 2 3 4 discussed earlier, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court refused to enforce an oral agreement to raise children exclusively in the Jewish faith, basing its decision on the "indefiniteness" of the contract. However, the Zummo court also
addressed the question of the "best interests of the child." The trial
court in Zummo concluded that to expose the children to a competing religion after so assiduously grounding them in the tenets of
Judaism would "unfairly confuse and disorient the children, and
perhaps vitiate all benefits flowing from either religion." 235 The
trial court based its conclusion on the dictum of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Morris, that "it is beyond dispute that a young
233. Id. at 1250-51.
234. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
235. Id. at 1142.
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child reared in two inconsistent religious traditions will quite prob23 6
ably experience some deleterious physical or mental effects."
However, on appeal the superior court in Zummo refused to
apply the reasoning of Morris and reversed the court's philosophy.
In Zummo, the superior court required proof of a "substantial

237
threat," rather than "some probability" of harm to the child.

The Zummo court argued that,
each parent must be free to provide religious exposure and instruction,
as that parent sees fit, during any and all period of legal custody or
visitation without restriction, unless the challenged beliefs or conduct
of the parent are demonstrated to present a substantial threat of present or future, physical or emotional, harm to the child in absence of the
proposed restriction. 2 3s
The superior court has taken an incongruous position. Ostensibly, in custody disputes, the governing factor is the best interests of
the child. The prospect of "some probability" of harm to the child
would, therefore, seem to outweigh the interest of one of the parents. Moreover, the right of one parent to expose the child to an
incompatible religion does not occur in a vacuum. The other parent
is likely to be as distressed at seeing the child indoctrinated into an
alien religion as the first parent would be if the court precluded him
or her from proselytizing the child. Even if the rights of the two
parents canceled each other out (a dubious proposition, if one of the
parents had voluntarily, and without duress, entered into a contract
on this matter), there remains "some probability" of harm to the
child. What is at stake in religious upbringing disputes is usually
not mere "exposure" but attempted indoctrination. Because children are highly malleable and impressionable, religious beliefs may
be quickly '%onded" onto them. Just as religious beliefs may be
"bonded" onto children, so may religious discord and conflict. A
court reflects gerrymandered logic when it considers "some
probability" of harm to the child as irrelevant, and regards the distress of the other parent as inconsequential.
In Gersovitz v. Siegner, 239 the Montana Supreme Court upheld
a trial court custody order granting joint custody but placing a child
who had been raised as a Jew during the marriage in the custody of
his non-Jewish mother during the school year. The father appealed
the custody order contending that granting custody to the mother
during the school year effectively prevented him from raising his
child in the Jewish faith. The trial court order stated, "[n]either
parent shall have the exclusive right to determine the child's reli236.
237.
238.
239.

Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1155.
Id. at 1154-55 (emphasis added).
Gersovitz v. Siegner, 779 P.2d 883 (Mont. 1989).
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gious education and affiliation. This determination is consistent
with the philosophy underlying joint custody and also with the reality of the child's heritage." 24 The father argued that the custody
arrangement would result in the child being raised in no religion at
all.
The Montana Supreme Court found that "an award of custody
for the purpose of religious education should not dominate other
elements which comprise the best interests of this particular
child."24 1 The supreme court did not find persuasive the holding in
in re Marriageof Simms, a 1987 Colorado District Court case. In
Simms, the court awarded a Jewish father custody for the purpose
of determining religious training even though it granted physical
custody to the mother. During the marriage, the mother had raised
the children in the Jewish faith, but after the separation she returned to the Catholic church and sought to raise the children in
both faiths. After hearing expert testimony, the Colorado District
Court found that only one parent should determine the religious
training of the children.
In Gersovitz, notwithstanding the award of "joint custody," the
court placed the child primarily in the custody of the mother. One
would, therefore, expect the mother to determine the religious upbringing of the child. However, basing its reasoning on the best interests doctrine, the Gersovitz court concluded that, "the child must
reside primarily with one parent during the time he attends school
so his education will not be interrupted by multiple custodial transfers." 243 The Gersovitz court did not find that a similar consistency
and stability in religious upbringing would also be in the child's best
interests. On the contrary, the trial court stated that its holding
that neither parent have exclusive right to determine the child's
religious education was consistent "with the reality of the child's
244
heritage."
The trial court is engaging in some minor sophistry. The issue
is religion, not heritage. The two are not synonymous. The AmericanHeritageDictionary,the major college dictionary in this nation,
would hardly have the word "heritage" in its title if that word had
any religious connotation at all. That dictionary defines heritage as
"[s]omething passed down from preceding generations, tradition."2 45 Santa Claus is heritage, Christ is religion. Multiple heri240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 884.

244. Gersovitz, 779 P.2d at 884.
245. AMERCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 607 (2d ed. 1982).
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tages present no great difficulty for a small child. Two mutually
exclusive, discordant religions, most likely do.
In Hanson v. Hanson,246 the North Dakota Supreme Court invoked the "clear demonstration of harm" standard when it overturned a trial court order restricting a noncustodial father from
involving his children in his Pentecostal religion. The father had
converted from Catholicism to the Pentecostal church. The trial
court found that the father was "press[ing] his new faith on the
children, thus causing them stress."24 7 The mother testified that
the father told the children that "the Catholic church believes in
cannibalism," and that "the Catholic church and Lutheran church
taught false doctrine." 24 8 The mother also testified that "the boys
are being "pulled back and forth" because of the conflict in their
parents' religious beliefs and that this "upsets" them." 9 However,
the supreme court, citing Munoz and Felton, found that "the evidence in this case falls short of the clear and affirmative showing of
physical or emotional harm to the children required to justify the
religious restrictions placed upon James' [the father's] visitation
rights."
Similarly, in Khalsa v. Khalsa,2 51 the New Mexico Court of Appeals overturned a trial court order enjoining a noncustodial Sikh
father from involving his children in his religion on the grounds
that the mother had failed to demonstrate in detail the alleged
harm to the children. The parties in Kha/sa had been married in
the Sikh faith and had raised their children in that faith during
their marriage. After the divorce, the mother remarried and discouraged the children from practicing Sikhism. The father protested and sought a change of custody. The mother provided
testimony from an expert witness that the children were disturbed
after their visits with the father. On the basis of this evidence, the
trial court restricted the father's religious activities with his children. However, the court of appeals found that the expert testimony was admitted in error because the mother failed to disclose
the identity of the expert witness until the day before the trial,
thereby depriving the father of any opportunity to depose the witness. In the absence of the excluded expert testimony, the appeals
court found the record insufficient to support the trial court's findings. The appeals court stated that, "physical or emotional harm to
the child cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated in detail,"
246. Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987).

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465.

251. Khalsa v. Khalsa, 751 P.2d 715, 720 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
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before the court can impose a religious restriction on visitation
25 2
rights.
IV. THE BEST INTERESTS DoCTRINE AND RELIGION

In the cases reviewed in the preceding pages, the courts recurringly raise the issue of balancing the best interests of the child
against the freedom of religion of one of the parents. However,
such a balancing incorrectly frames the issue and skews the outcome of the dispute. In the religious upbringing disputes which are
the subject of this article, one parent has broken an explicit, voluntary commitment on the religious identity and education of the children of the marriage. The other parent placed great reliance on
that commitment. Thus, these cases do not present a simple issue
of freedom of religion. The first parent is free to believe in any
faith he or she chooses. Rather, the issue is the freedom to casually
break a very profound commitment, when breaking that commitment may have a crucial impact on the identity of the child and a
grievous effect on the stable parent.
Framing religious upbringing disputes solely in First Amendment terms does a disservice. The conflict is not between a restrictive court decree and the First Amendment. On the contrary, the
issue is a parent's right to unilaterally alter a most intrinsic and
significant aspect of a child's future balanced against the rights of
that child and the rights of the other parent. An analogy may help
clarify the distinction. A parochial elementary school hires a
teacher of another faith for secular studies. The teacher, however,
begins to "instruct" his students in his own faith. The school demands he cease these activities. He refuses to do so stating that he
will not allow the school to violate his First Amendment right of
freedom of religion. The teacher's claim, of course, is nonsense.
The students' parents hold the First Amendment right to decide
and direct the religious upbringing of those children, not the
teacher. Governmental action to prevent the school from prohibiting the teacher's unwanted religious "instruction" would clearly infringe the First Amendment rights of the parents. For, unlike the
parents, the teacher has no basis for claiming First Amendment
rights with respect to those children.
In the same fashion, a parent who breaks an antenuptial agreement on the religious upbringing of children has no basis for claiming First Amendment rights with respect to the children. By
entering into a religious upbringing agreement, the parent freely
and knowingly transferred away the First Amendment right to decide and direct the religious upbringing of those children. At the
252. Id. at 720.
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very least, the parent who entered a religious upbringing agreement did so as consideration for the marriage. The parent who depended on the other parent to honor the contract placed the
greatest of reliance on that agreement. Therefore, when a court refuses to even consider a religious upbringing contract in its custody
determination, the court violates the reliant parent's First Amendment right to decide and direct the religious upbringing of the children. At the same time, through the court's deliberate inaction, the
party who voluntarily entered into and then broke the most solemn
of commitments, reacquires a most significant right. Courts are disingenuous in claiming that their refusal to consider a religious upbringing agreement does not infringe upon the First Amendment
right of the reliant parent on the ground that he or she may still
expose the child to his or her religion.
Courts appear extremely sensitive to the adverse effects of
even the most ethereal manifestations of religion when there is a
church-state issue involved. In Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District,253 for example, the court prohibited the local community
minister from delivering non-denominational invocations at a public high school graduation. The Sands court based its decision on
the possibility that such an invocation might offend agnostics, atheists or non Judeo-Christians in the audience and might suggest implied government support for religion. The religious content at
issue in Sands was a forty-five second invocation, delivered once
during four years of high school, making mention of "our Heavenly
Father," not deliberately targeted to any specific individual, and
heard by a seventeen year old atheist or agnostic student in the audience, who already had a defined attitude on religion. Nonetheless, because the court considered that the invocation infringed the
First Amendment rights of that student and his or her parents, it
mandated intervention.
Yet, courts are much less sensitive to the adverse effect of religious content in the context of religious upbringing disputes. Thus,
courts purport that to subjugate one's child to a deliberate indoctrination in a religion that conflicts with or denies the reliant parent's
faith does not infringe, let alone abrogate, that parent's right to direct the religious upbringing of that child. This reasoning is inconsistent. The right to direct a child's religious upbringing includes
not only the right to teach the child what to believe, but also, the
right to teach the child what not to believe.
It is doubtful that judicial inaction in religious upbringing disputes serves the best interests of the child. In cases where a psychologist or psychiatrist testified before the court, not once has the
253. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991).
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expert witness stated that exposure to conflicting religions would
be harmless, let alone beneficial, for the child. On the contrary,
every professional expert on the well-being of children has testified
that such exposure is, or is likely to be, harmful.
Because the courts purportedly accord great deference to the
"best interests of the child," the doctrine warrants closer scrutiny.
The best interests of the child doctrine dictates that for all practical
purposes, the custodial parent determines the child's religion. At
least for children of tender years, the custodial parent is the parent
who was the primary caretaker during the marriage unless the primary caretaker is shown to be grossly unfit. The primary caretaker
is virtually always the mother.254 Therefore, absent gross unfitness, the court awards the mother custody, and thereby, the right to
dictate the religious upbringing of the child. Thus, the "best interests of the child" doctrine, at least for a child of tender years,
amounts to a female equivalent of a principle long discarded and
discredited in the English speaking world, "religio sequitur patrem" (religion follows the father). Religious determination based
on the "best interests" principle, therefore, turns out to be considerably more arbitrary and more skewed toward mothers, than would
appear on its face.
In a custody dispute involving children of tender years, the
rights of a father who honored an antenuptial religious upbringing
254. Richard Neely, The PrimaryCaretakerParentRule: Child Custody and
the Dynamics of Greed,3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168,180-82 (1984). Judge Richard Neely, who wrote the opinion in the leading case of the primary caretaker
principle, Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va.1981), writes:
West Virginia law does not permit a maternal preference. But we do accord an explicit and almost absolute preference to the "primary caretaker
parent," defined as the parent who: (1) prepares the meals; (2) changes the
diapers and dresses and bathes the child; (3) chauffeurs the child to school,
church, friends' homes and the like; (4) provides medical attention,
monitors the child's health, and is responsible for taking the child to the
doctor, and (5) interacts with the child's friends, school authorities, and
other parents engaged in activities that involve the child.
This list of criteria usually, but not necessarily, spells "mother." ...
Our rule inevitably involves some injustice to fathers who, as a group, are
usually not primary caretakers. There are instances where the primary
caretaker will not be the better custodian in the long ran ....

[However] [o]nce the primary caretaker has been identified, the only question is whether that parent is a "fit parent." In this regard, the court is not
concerned with assessing the relative degrees of fitness between the two
parents, but only with whether the primary caretaker achieves a passing

grade on an objective test.... Under our system a mother's lawyer can tell
her that if she has been the primary caretaker and is a fit parent, she has
a ,solutely no chance of losing custody....
Neely, supra at 180-82.
Neely's article immediately discloses that the sole purpose of his invention
of the primary caretaker rule was to provide a mechanism to provide mothers
with custody, and to preclude fathers from contesting custody. The primary

caretaker principle is the subject of an article now in preparation.
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agreement will have no effect unless the court weighs the rights of
the father into the custody determination before, not after, the
court ascertains the "best interests" of the child. Otherwise, the
father's rights will be washed away by the best interests/custodial
parent/primary caretaker/tender years/maternal presumption
principle.
The policy proposed here begins with a presumption that the
court will award custody of the child to the parent honoring the
religious upbringing agreement, absent a finding that this arrangement conflicts with the child's best interests. Courts face two obstacles which may preclude them from adopting this policy. First,
although courts ostensibly consider the rights of parents in determining custody, the courts hold the "best interests of the child" as
"controlling," "primary," and "paramount." The net result is that
parents' interests and rights take a back seat in custody determinations. The priority courts accord to the best interests of the child is
exemplified by cases in which wives who engage in adulterous relationships terminating the marriage, still win custody of the children
because the courts determine that the children's best interests will
be better served with their primary caretaker, their mother. It is
unclear how the best interests of the child has taken priority over
the rights of the parents. The United States Supreme Court has
described parents' rights in controlling the rearing of children as
"cardinal," "basic in the structure of our society," and "fundamental. '255 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized parents' rights to
control the religious education of their children.2 56 Since these parental rights are fundamental rights, courts must strictly scrutinize
any statute or governmental act that abridges these rights. Furthermore, since the policy proposed in this article is predicated on
recognition of the child's best interest, there is no logical reason
why courts should not effectuate the rights of a parent who has relied to his or her detriment on a spouse who breaches a religious
upbringing agreement thereby furthering the best interest of the
children.
The second obstacle to taking this approach is the courts' refusal to make religion a major issue in custody disputes. This attitude will be addressed below.
255. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (cited in Mangrum,
supra note 2, at 50); Ginsberg v New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
256. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (Oregon act requiring parents to send their children, ages eight through sixteen, to public schools
in their district for the entire school year, unreasonably interferes with parent's
liberty of parents to direct upbringing of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of any languages other than English
in any school evades liberty of the Fourteenth).
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Two FAITHS

When courts either refuse to enforce religious upbringing
agreements or refuse to limit noncustodial parents' religious involvement with or indoctrination of their children, children are
often consigned to being raised in two religions. Some courts assert
that a child can be raised in two conflicting faiths simultaneously,
without a deleterious impact. 257 However, with the exception of
Zummo, courts fail to cite any evidence, data, or authority to support this assertion. 25s Moreover, even the court in Zummo, which
cited "commentaries and empirical studies" to buttress its position, 259 totally misread those "commentaries and studies."
To demonstrate that "exposure" to contradictory religions is
not harmful to children, the Zummo court relied primarily on the
work of Egon Mayer, a prominent sociologist at the City University
of New York.2 60 However, Professor Mayer refutes application of
his work to the claims of the Zummo court, writing, "the study [is]
virtually inapplicable to an understanding of the particular situation of a child who is thrust by divorce into being raised in two religions." 261 The Zummo court also quotes Petsonk and Remsen,
authors of The IntermarriageHandbook, as suggesting that "expos257. See, e.g., Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. 260, 279 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Mass. 1981); Zummo v. Zummo, 574
A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136
(Wash. 1971).
258. See Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d. at 266. The Mentry court quoted the Felton court, 418 N.E.2d at 680, who suggested that such dual upbringing may
sometimes be a "sound stimulant" for the child. In noting this, the Felton court
cited Smith v. Smith, 367 P.2d 230 (Ariz. 1961). However, the Smith court said
no such thing.
259. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1157.
260. Id. at 1156 (citing EGON MAYER, LOvE AND CHILDREN OF TRADITION:
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JEWS AND CHRiSTiANS 277 (1983)).
261. Letter from Egon Mayer to Martin Weiss (July 16, 1990) (on file with
author).
In a letter to this author dated July 16, 1990, Dr. Mayer writes:
The study [was] based on 117 children-of-intermarried couples, ranging in
age from 16-42 (i.e. children in the sense of progeny not of childhood age).
All werefrom in-tactfamilies to eliminate any possible effects of divorce.
The principal objective of the study was to discover the relationship between being raised in an intermarriage and later ethnic-religious identification. Only secondarily, and to a very limited extent did the study attempt
to evaluate any possible emotional correlates of being raised in an
intermarriage.
We had no standardized measure of self-esteem or emotional well-being
built into the study. Our main interest in this area was whether or not
respondents showed evidence of emotional marginality, as explained in the
study, vis-a-vis their parents and extended families.
These and other limitations make the study virtually inapplicable to an
understandingof the particularsituation of a child who is thrust by divorce into being raised in two religions.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ing a child to more than one religion in the various households to
which [the child] is attached does not, by itself, cause [the child]
emotional stress or identity confusion." 262 However, inexplicably
missing from the excerpt quoted in Zummo is the immediately preceding caveat that this statement is only applicable when there is no
parental conflict on religious matters. 263 Obviously, parents who
seek judicial resolution of a religious upbringing agreement conflict
on religious matters. A court may posit that parents who truly care
for their child have a responsibility to insure that their religious
conflict does not spill over onto the child. But a court is blind to
reality when it presumes that a Jewish father, who takes his faith
seriously, can quietly acquiesce as his son is proselytized into a
"Jews for Jesus" cult. The court is wrong. Conflict over religious
upbringing is not caused by parental indifference to the harm that
may come to the child. On the contrary, such conflict occurs precisely because the parent does care about the harmful effect on the
child.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Petsonk and Remsen are
writers, rather than researchers, psychologists, or sociologists. The
portion of the chapter which the court quoted in Zummo was their
synopsis of the work of Egon Mayer and Karen Kaufman, 2 64 a
clinical psychologist in Berkeley, California. Kaufman, like Mayer,
is surprised at and rejects the conclusions the Zummo court drew
265
from her work.
The work of Mayer and Kaufman provided the sole empirical
basis for the Zummo court's position. However, the Zummo court
also cited numerous handbooks written either by members of the
clergy or by individuals who intermarried. 266 These sources are
clearly of anecdotal value only and do not constitute empirical studies. Interestingly, however, contrary to the Zummo court's claim,
262. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1156.
263. JuDrrH PETSONK AND Jim REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOK, A
GUiDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 117 (1988). Petsonk and Remsen write, immediately preceding the quote excepted in Zummo, "but a crucialfactor must
be present Both parents must agree with and stand behind the religiouspattern
... chosen for [the] home." Id. (emphasis added).
264. Karen Kaufman, Four Religious Childrearing Approaches of Interfaith
Couples: The Effect on Parental Satisfaction, Family Cohesion, and Child Behavior 1986 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, California Graduate School of
Marital and Family Therapy, Berkeley, California).
265. In a letter to the author dated August 30, 1990, Dr. Kaufman writes:

All couples, as a condition of participation in the study, needed to report
that they were in agreement as to the way in which they were raising their
children with regard to religious instruction and affiliation. Therefore, the
study does not apply to the situationof raisinga child in two faiths when

parents are not in agreement in this matter."
Letter from Dr. Karen Kaufman to Martin Weiss (Aug. 30, 1990) (on file with
author) (emphasis added).
266. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
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most of the handbook authors argue that children should be raised
in one faith, not two. The most recent of these books, which has
received considerable attention in the general press, is Mixed Blessings by Cowan.2 67 Cowan found that now grown children of intermarriage expressed the same opinion, "parents should choose a
religiousidentity for their children and not leave it up to them to
choose.

'268

267. PAUL COWAN & RACHEL COWAN, MIXED BLESSINGS: MARRIAGE BETWEEN JEWS AND CHRIusTiANs (1987).
268. COWAN & COWAN, supra note 267, at 247 (emphasis added). Cowan
writes:
What about our children? We're adults and we can maintain our separate
identities, but what about them? That question, more than any other,
haunts the people who come to our workshops. Listen, as two... interviewed give their answen
"When I go to church or a synagogue I feel interested, but not connected to either religion. If you asked me what I am, I'd say I'm Jewish but
I come from a mixed marriage and religiously I'm not Jewish at all. At
times, I feel as if I have a special outlook, a window into both worlds. But
sometimes I get the sense that I have a foot in each territory and I'm not a
citizen of either .... "
"All my life I've been aware of being half and half. I feel like I'm on
the fringes of things in a lot of ways. I'm half Jewish, half Christian .... I
just feel there are a whole lot of ways I don't belong. I've wanted to know
who I was ever since I was a teenager."
Whatever their age, whatever their gender or generation, most children of intermarriage sound variations of these themes. They are not talking about happiness. There is no evidence, in our interviews or in the few
studies that have been done, that children of intermarriage are more or less
cheerful, more or less content with their lives, more or less loving to
spouses or children, more or less successful in their professions, than any
other group of people. Many say that they feel unusually well equipped to
move back and forth between two cultures.
Others experience a negative version of that same feeling. They say
they feel like double agents, darting back and forth between enemy
lines....
Some people ... [feel] that the cross and the star are at war inside
[them]. Most of these people describe a lifelong sense of rootlessness, a
lifelong need to resolve persistent questions about their identities.
The children of intermarriages we interviewed ranged in age from
eighteen to forty-five .... They grew up in a time when synagogues were
much more hostile to interfaith couples than they are now ....
When we interviewed them, they had no preconceptions of what they
would say;, we had no idea of what we would hear. Often, as they talked,
confusions and angers that had been bottled up for years poured forth. The
depths of their feelings surprised them and us. Their stories were long and
complicated. Clearly the fact that one parent was Jewish and one was
Christian was only one aspect of their childhood experience, one explanation for complicated attitudes about themselves, their place in the world,
and the religious values.
Yet within their collective responses we found clear patterns. They
described pitfalls that face any interfaith couple. They sounded warnings
that we feel parents should hear.
At the end of our interviews, we asked them whether they wished
their parents had done anything different about their religious upbringing.
Of course, the answer varied from person to person. But both those who
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However, this article does not concern interfaith marriage. In
such marriages, the partners usually make no commitment on the
faith of the children, and religious identity is usually not a major
factor. Rather, this article concerns marriages that were entered
into on a single faith basis, either because both partners were of the
same faith or because one partner converted to the other's faith. As
even the most "liberal" of these guidebooks, Happily Intermarried,
states, "a family in which one parent converts to the religion of the
other is no longer an "interreligious" family, and there should be no
possibility of disputes over the religion in which the children will be
269
raised."
In part, the position that raising a child in two religions is
harmless, may be a consequence of language. Those who argue that
a child can be raised in two religions without harm may be confusing culture with religion and ceremony with faith. Although a child
probably can grow up with both Christmas trees and Hanukkah
presents, these traditions are actually quite peripheral to the beliefs
of Christianity and Judaism. When such traditions are observed
primarily for cultural or social reasons, rather than for religious
reasons, they are no more incompatible than St. Patrick's Day and
Columbus Day. In many "interfaith" marriages, the degree of religiosity is not particularly intense and Christmas and Hanukkah are,
in fact, cultural rather than spiritual events. Hence, in such marriages, there is no great incompatibility. Perhaps "interfaith" marriages such as these, which are secular rather than religious in their
character, provide the anecdotal basis for the Zummo court's opinion. Indeed, in the social strata to which judges belong, such a "sophisticated," "low key" approach to religion is relatively
fashionable.
praised their parents and those who criticized them conveyed the same

message. They valued clarity and a sense of security. They felt parents
should choose a religious identity for their children and not leave it up to
them to choose. Furthermore, they thought parents should furnish an environment in which the children would feel comfortable living with that
identity.
They wanted roots in one of their parents' religions and cultures, but
branches that extended to the other's. Indeed, many of the children we
talked with were troubled that one parent had suppressed all traces of his
or her own religious heritage and culture. In many cases, the children had
felt compelled to follow the few clues they had found about this past and
sought to re-create that hidden identity for themselves.

Id. at 245-48.
The last paragraph is likely the sentiment the Zummo court interpreted as
being a call for raising the children of interfaith marriages in two religions. It
is, however, nothing of the sort. The sentiment calls not to suppress or deny the
heritage of either parent.
269. Roy A. ROSENBERG ET AL., HAPPILY INTERMARRIED: AUTHORATIVE ADVICE FOR A JOYOUS JEWISH-CHRISTIAN MkRRIAGE 144 (1989).
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Proponents of raising a child in two religions also error in characterizing religious beliefs. They argue that since a child can go to
temple on Saturday and then go to church on Sunday, there is no
conflict. One's faith, however, is more than a matter of scheduling.
One's faith does not begin and end with a weekly religious service.
It is present throughout the week. One's identity within, and identification with, a faith, carries through the entire week, and is not
confined to a forty-five minute bolus.
Two sets of conflicting, mutually negating beliefs are unlikely
to benefit a small child. At root, Christianity and Judaism are conflicting, mutually negating, beliefs.2 0 The central tenet of Christianity, that one can attain salvation and reach God only through
faith in Jesus Christ, effectively negates and invalidates all other
religions, including Judaism. Conversely, Judaism absolutely rejects the divinity of Christ. These two beliefs have not been reconciled in nearly two thousand years. It is unclear then, how, by court
decree, the two beliefs are to be suddenly and successfully reconciled within the mind of a seven year old boy.
Those who foresee no adverse impact from raising a child in
two conflicting religions argue that the child will simply be exposed
to two religions and choose one of them. There are, however, three
immediate problems with this argument. First, when parents conflict over religion and the child tilts toward the religion of one parent, he or she creates stress in the relationship with the other
parent. A small child should not bear this burden. Second, unlike
adults, children are not capable of realistically weighing what they
are told. They do not have a lifetime of experience as a basis for
deciding what to accept and what to reject. Thus, it is unclear on
what basis courts suppose children to have the maturity and wisdom to choose between religions. It is indeed remarkable that
courts hold seventeen year olds to be uniformly incapable of signing
up for a four-week course of Arthur Murray dance lessons, 271 yet
cite no reason why a seven year old child can effectively choose between Judaism and Christianity. Finally, children no more
"choose" a religion than adults do. We believe what we believe, to a
very large extent, based on what we were indoctrinated into as children. On reaching adulthood, most people who were raised as
Christians, if they remain religious, remain Christians. Most who
were raised as Jews, if they remain religious, remain Jews. Of
course, people do freely and frequently change the intensity of their
270. Funk v. Ossman, 724 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
271. WHALEY, supra note 132 ("infants" under eighteen lack the capacity to
enter into contracts; the law treats minors "as if they have the mental capacities
of chimpanzees, and does not hold them to any higher standard.").
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religious involvement, but leaving one religion for another is
uncommon.
Beliefs and attitudes indoctrinated during childhood can become "imprinted" and carried on into adulthood. If religious beliefs
can be imprinted, it stands to reason that so can religious conflict.
Such dissonance may not be "broadening." On the contrary, it may
be quite disabling. One is unlikely to find a single individual in this
nation who professes to be both Episcopalian and Mormon. If no
adult is able to hold two beliefs, even when the beliefs are not particularly disparate, why would a court propose that a child is capable of holding two beliefs?
In either a custody dispute or in an adoption proceeding, the
court attempts to place a child in a stable environment. In such a
hearing, the court might consider an individual who actively practices two religions to be unstable or disturbed. Therefore, the court
should not deliberately and consciously create in a child what it is
leery of in an adult. In fact, courts are conscious of this need. Both
in divorce and adoption, the courts try to place the child with parents who will continue the child's religious identity.2 72 Courts recognize the trauma that may result if a child raised as a Catholic is
sent into a Protestant home. Courts are well aware of the need for
3
continuity and the need for stability in belief.
The medical profession is also well aware of the consequences
that can result from a lack of continuity and stability in religious
belief. The DSM-III-R, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the standard reference, not only in this country, but worldwide, for the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders. This
manual devotes considerable attention to Identity Disorder, a
mental disorder which most commonly arises in late adolescence.
The DSM-III-R describes Identity Disorder as a:
272. See Mangrum, supra note 2, at 60 nn.171-74 (numerous statutes cited).

273. But not all courts share this view. In Zummo, the court stated:
For children of divorce in general, and children of intermarriage and
divorce especially, exposure to parents' conflicting values, lifestyles, and
religious beliefs may indeed cause doubts and stress. However, stress is not
always harmful, nor is it always to be avoided and protected against. The
key, is not whether the child experiences stress, but whether the stress
experienced is unproductively severe.
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). This is a curious
statement. Courts routinely go to great lengths to protect divorced wives (and
occasionally divorced husbands) from the stress of suffering a drop in their
standard of living upon divorce (e.g. from upper middle class to middle class),
by placing onerous support obligations on the other party. It is unclear why
fully mature adults should be so eagerly shielded from "stress" by the courts,
yet small children require the threshold of "unproductively severe," to the
point of fecal incontinence, as in Funk v. Ossman before the courts entertain
protection.
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severe subjective distress regarding inability to integrate aspects of the
self into a relatively coherent and acceptable sense of self. There is
uncertainty about a variety of issues relating to identity, including...
religious identification, moral value systems, and group loyalties ....
Conflict regarding values and loyalties may include concerns about
religious identification, patterns of sexual behavior, and moral issues.
The person experiences these conflicts as irreconcilable aspects of his
or her personality and, as a result, fails to perceive himself or herself as
having a coherent identity. Frequently the disturbance is epitomized
by the person's asking, "Who am I?"
Mild anxiety and depression are common and are usually related
to inner preoccupations rather than external events. Self-doubt and
doubt about the future are usually present, and take the form of either
difficulty in making choices or impulsive experimentation. Negative
or oppositional patterns are often chosen in an attempt to establish an
independent identity distinct from family or other close people. Such
attempts may include transient experimental phases of widely divergent behavior as the person "tries on" various roles.
Frequently there is a phase with acute onset, which either resolves
over a period of time or becomes chronic. In other instances the onset
is more gradual. If the disorder begins in adolescence, it is usually resolved by the mid-20s. If it becomes chronic, however, the person may
be unable to make a career commitment, or may fail to form lasting
emotional attachments, with resulting frequent shifts in jobs, relationships, and career directions.
The degree of impairment varies. Usually there is some interference in both occupational (including academic) and social functioning,
with deterioration in friendships and family relationships. Educational
achievement and work performance below that appropriate to the person's intellectual ability may result from this disorder. [However,]
"[there is] no information [on prevalence]. The disorder
is apparently
2 74
more common now then several decades ago .... "
It would be a gross presumption to claim that all or even most
children raised in two conflicting religions will suffer from Identity
Disorder. Clearly, many children raised in two conflicting faiths
can shrug off the conflicts and do well. Just as clearly, though,
some children cannot shrug off these conflicts and will suffer.
VI.

COMMENTS ON OTHER REVIEWS

Others who have reviewed the question of the enforcement of
religious upbringing agreements have taken a position quite opposite the position taken in this article. This article has dealt with
most of their objections. Two objections, however, remain. Leo
Pfeffer, in his article, Religion in the Upbringingof Children, in
the Boston University Law Review, 275 offers another rationale for
not enforcing religious upbringing agreements. It should be noted
274.

AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,

DSM-III-R, DIAGNOSTIC AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 89-91 (1987).

275. Pfeffer, supra note 2, at 362.
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that the Zummo court referred to Mr. Pfeffer as "the venerable
' 6
advocate of religious liberty." 7
Pfeffer writes as follows:
Why, it may well be asked, should such agreements not be enforced? Why should they not be accorded the legal sanctions enjoyed
by other agreements? By statute everywhere, contracts in contemplation of marriage remain in effect and are enforceable after the marriage takes place .... Where the agreement is made in contemplation
of a marriage which otherwise would not have been entered into, the
principles of estoppel would seem to dictate its enforceability.
... There is ....no basis for estoppel because the promisee... got
exactly what he bargained for - a promise that the children would be
brought up in his faith. He could not bargain for judicial 277
enforcement
of the promise because it was not the promisor's to give.

By Pfeffer's line of reasoning, all that is required of any promisor in any contract is the mere mouthing or writing of the promise.
Carrying out the promise is superfluous. An analogy will show the
absurdity of this view of contractual obligation. A homeowner has a
policy with an insurance company for fire protection. Year in and
year out, the homeowner pays premiums. Year in and year out, the
insurance company issues a policy, promising to indemnify the
homeowner in event of fire. There is a fire, and the house burns
down. The homeowner submits his claim, but the insurance company refuses to honor it. The company argues that all the premiums bought was a promise of insurance, not actual insurance.
Obviously, this is a nonsensical view of contracts which deserves no
further discussion.

In The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce,2 78
Zarowny stated:
One may be tempted to look for ulterior motives behind parents'
actions in post-divorce religious upbringing cases. A custodial parent
trying to graft religious training obligations onto the divorce settlement may simply want to decrease the non-custodial parent's visitation
privileges to the point that they become meaningless. (citation omitted). Undoubtedly, religious training can be used as a weapon by a
vengeful former spouse to carry on a battle which should have ended
with the divorce. The children can become, as one judge stated, "footballs to satisfy the "I'll show you" attitudes with which estranged
spouses too frequently are imbued." 279

The article cites Smith v. Smith,2 0 as the source of this quote.
However, viewed in context, the judge's remark takes on a very different appearance. The opinion offers the quoted remark as an ad276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1132.
Pfeffer, supra note 2, at 362-63.
Zarowny, supra note 2.
Id. at 161 (footnotes omitted).
Smith v. Smith, 249 P.2d 419 (1953).
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monition warning to divorced parents to avoid such attitudes.
Moreover, the divorce in Smith involved absolutely no religious upbringing dispute. Thus, Smith does not support the author's assertion that parents who seek enforcement of religious upbringing
agreements have ulterior motives.
V. THE CouRTs AND RELIGION
When courts refuse to apply contract principles to religious upbringing disputes and refuse to limit religious indoctrination by
noncustodial parents, they purport to be confirming their neutral
attitude toward religion. This judicial neutrality with respect to
religion warrants closer scrutiny. Courts are made up of individual
judges who have individual religious beliefs. Clearly, there is little
danger that those religious beliefs will enter into the courts' decisions. But, while it is clearly recognized that the law proscribes the
injection of the court's personal attitude toward a specific religion,
either favorable or unfavorable, it is not as clear that the law similarly proscribes the injection of the court's personal attitude toward
religion per se. Attitudes toward religion per se may color the
court's decision between parents over the religious upbringing of
their children. A brief commentary on judicial attitudes toward
religion is, therefore, justified.
Attitudes toward religion range across a wide span. The most
hostile attitude is that of the Marxist/Freudian schools, prevalent
in academic circles and such social sciences as sociology and psychology. Marx's characterization of religions as "the opiate of the
masses," 281 succinctly summarizes the Marxist position. Freud regarded religion as "adult oedipal complex." 2 2 It is doubtful that
even a handful of judges hold such extreme views, but Marxist/Freudian attitudes toward religion may surreptitiously enter
into the court's decision through custody evaluations or expert testimony by social workers, psychologists, or psychiatrists.
Less hostile attitudes toward religion are no doubt more typical, but these attitudes too, may color a court's decision. For
instance, there is a widespread truism among the more "sophisticated" that all religions are basically the same, that all people believe in the same God, and that all people share the same moral and
ethical values. Courts with this attitude would have little patience
for religious upbringing disputes, particularly if one parent claimed
that a child was being subjected to- "incompatible" beliefs. However, the philosophy that all religions are essentially the same, is a
281. KARL MARX, INTRODUCTION TO A CRITIQUE OF THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1844).
282. SIGMUND FREUD, FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (1949).
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gross simplification which bespeaks a misunderstanding of the nature of religion. Although many religious leaders might disagree,
religions are defined not by belief in God, but by belief in men.
Christianity is defined by belief in the claims of Christ, Judaism by
belief in the teachings of Moses, Islam by belief in the visions of
Mohammed. The teaching, values, and histories of these religions
are quite distinct. Despite public posturing, there are significant
tensions and conflicts between these faiths. The fact that these religions outwardly profess mutual respect and coexist side by side in
the public arena does not justify the conclusion that they will coexist successfully in the mind of a child.
Courts may also hold the attitude that religion is unnecessary
for a child, that the conflict over his or her religious identity is
much ado about nothing, and that the child would be better off being raised in a secular framework. If a child's choice is between
being raised simultaneously in two conflicting religions or being
raised in the humanist tradition, the latter option is almost certainly preferable for the child. Many children who are raised without religion have happy childhoods and grow up to be successful
adults.
But that is usually not the option before the court. Usually the
court's choice is not between religion and the absence of religion,
but between being raised in one religion or being raised in two. It is
conceivable that a small child may intellectualize the conflicts between the two religions and, as a consequence, abandon both religions in favor of secular humanism. It is also quite conceivable,
though, that a child will internalize the conflicts between the two
religions and, as a consequence, suffer anxiety. Unless the court
can predict with great assurance which course a particular child
will follow, the court should avoid taking the position that religion
is irrelevant to the well-being of the child.
The courts, in fact, have generally not taken the position that
religion is irrelevant to a child's welfare. On the contrary, in at
least 105 cases, courts have noted the need to assure the "spiritual
well-being" of the child in determining custody and visitation
28 4
rights.m Thus, many courts clearly recognize that spiritual
well-being is of great importance to the welfare of the child. Yet,
courts continue to permit children to be raised in two conflicting
religions despite the fact that no one has shown that being raised in
two conflicting religions is conducive to the spiritual well-being of a
young child.
283. Russ, supra note 2.
284. Spiritual "relat[es] to religious.
1256 (5th ed. 1979).

. .
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Another attitude toward religion also warrants mention. This
is the view that religion is irrational, that religious upbringing disputes are, therefore, irrational, and that courts should not adjudicate these disputes. There are faults in this reasoning. A court's
refusal to adjudicate an antenuptial religious upbringing contract,
on the ground that it considers the religions of the parties to be
irrational, would appear to violate the First Amendment and the
right to due process of law. Even if religion is, in fact irrational, one
cannot conclude that disputes concerning religious upbringing are
irrational. Indeed, a great many significant disputes before the
courts, particularly family courts, have an "irrational" basis. Thus,
the issue is not whether the underlying basis for the dispute is irrational. The issue is whether the dispute is significant. Religious upbringing disputes are significant. A child raised as a Jew, may grow
up to be very different from the person he or she would have become if raised as a Mormon. He or she may perceive the world differently, marry a different partner, and raise a different family.
These are not unimportant disputes.
CONCLUSION

This article discussed an area of law in which custody battles
and religious conflict overlap. Few areas of law involve disputes of
such intensity. Few areas of law demand more difficult decisions of
judges. However, the difficulties facing the court are minor in comparison to the difficulties facing the young children who find themselves thrust involuntarily into a battle between their parents, and
a battle between religions. There is little stability and great turmoil
for such children.
In custody determinations, the court's role is to attempt to "repair the world" for the children who are the focus of, and all too
often the victims of these battles. That role may be performed less
effectively by a court which maintains a studied indifference to the
struggle over the religious upbringing and identity of the child.
That indifference, which some courts may euphemistically describe as "neutrality," is best exemplified by the philosophy articulated in Felton, that the law tolerates and even encourages, "[up to
harm] demonstrable in detail" the indoctrination of children in conflicting religions. Courts in California, Pennsylvania, and other
states have adopted the Felton standard, thereby abandonir, the
standard which required only a showing of "reasonable - *z of
harm" for the court to intervene in defense of the best interests of
the child. The "demonstrable harm" standard is a misreading of
the law and reckless policy.
Judicial indifference to religion is also reflected in the courts'
refusal to enforce antenuptial agreements on the religious upbring-
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ing of children. For many, however, agreement on religion remains
an essential element of marriage. Such individuals would never
have married in the absence of either a shared religious faith, or an
antenuptial religious upbringing agreement.
This article therefore reaches the following conclusions:
1. In custody disputes involving a significant religious upbringing conflict, courts should award custody to the party who
seeks enforcement of an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement, provided the court finds that party to be a fit and loving parent, and absent a determination that the best interests of the child
would be better served by awarding custody to the other parent.
2. Courts should not invoke the statute of frauds to render a
religious upbringing agreement unenforceable if the agreement is
evidenced by the background and histories of the parties, the religious ceremony in which the marriage took place, or the conversion
of one of the partners.
3. Courts should favor and seek spiritual stability for children. If there is a significant religious upbringing conflict between
the parents, regardless of whether custody is sole or joint, the court
should order that the child be raised in a single faith. Also courts
should permit some exposure to the other parent's religion, absent a
finding that such exposure is reasonably likely to distress or harm
the child.
The positions taken in this article are at variance with current
conventional opinion. However, the approach proposed here is cogent, neutral, and consistent with the best interests of the child. It
offers a considerable improvement over the indifference that currently holds sway in some courts. Neither Constitution, common
law, nor common sense can justify that indifference.

